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Regulation By Bootstrap: Contingent
Management of Hazardous Wastes Under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
t
Jeffrey M. Gaba

In the lastfew years, EPA has increasingly employed the questionable
technique of "contingent management" to regulate wastes under the federal
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in order to limit the costs
and avoid the stigma of hazardous waste classification. Through the
technique of contingent management, EPA has exempted materials from
classification as hazardous waste on the condition that the materials are
managed in the particularmanner specified in the regulation. The ultimate
bootstrap, contingent management allows EPA to regulate non-hazardous
wastes over which it has no statutory jurisdiction. Perhaps more troubling,
contingent management allows EPA to avoid the specific statutory scheme
adopted by Congressfor the regulation of hazardous wastes.
Although one case appears to endorse the use of contingent
management, the most significant issues raised by this technique have not
been addressed. The legality of the contingent management technique is far
from clear. Among other things, EPA is relying on the factors of cost and
stigma that may not properly be considered in classifying wastes as
hazardous, and EPA is avoiding specific statutory requirements that would
otherwise apply to hazardous wastes. Furthermore,the rationale used by
EPA to justify contingent management is essentially boundless; EPA could
potentially eliminate the statutory requirements of RCRA by regulating any
otherwise hazardous waste through contingent management. EPA is, in
effect, asserting discretion to regulate such wastes in any manner it deems
appropriate.This is a position rejected by Congress when it amended RCRA
in 1984 to constrain EPA's discretion. Given these concerns, courts should
closely scrutinize EPA's use of contingent management and not defer to
EPA 's constructionof its authority under RCRA.
After discussing the rationale and weaknesses of contingent
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management, this Article concludes with recommendations for a more
rationaland consistent means of classifying and regulatinghazardous waste.
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What's in a name? that which we call a rose
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Introduction
The regulatory world of hazardous waste is understood by few but
feared by all. Once the dreaded classification of "hazardous" attaches, solid
waste becomes a costly pariah. Under the provisions of Subtitle C of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), hazardous waste is
generally subject to complex and expensive federal requirements relating to
its management, treatment, disposal and recycling. Through the "mixture,"
"derived-from," and "contained-in" rules, hazardous waste infects everything
with which it comes into contact and subjects otherwise benign materials to
the costly Subtitle C requirements. Perhaps worst of all, hazardous waste
bears a stigma; it is marked as "unclean." Industries fear the public reaction
to news that they generate or manage "hazardous waste."
I

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2. As will become clear, the focus of

this article is attempts by EPA to regulate hazardous wastes without calling them hazardous wastes.
2
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, §§ 3001-3023, 42 U.S.C. §§
6921- 6939e (2000).
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Given the costs and other consequences of hazardous waste
classification, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has for
years explored legal mechanisms to regulate "not very hazardous" wastes.
These are wastes that might meet the statutory and regulatory criteria for
classification as hazardous wastes but can, in EPA's view, be adequately.
controlled without imposing the full set of Subtitle C requirements.' EPA's
goal has been to minimize the unwanted consequences of hazardous waste
classification while ensuring adequate regulatory controls.
EPA has explored a number of regulatory alternatives for regulating
"not very hazardous" waste, but three approaches have dominated.
First,
since the earliest regulation under RCRA, EPA has established separate and
reduced requirements for certain types of hazardous waste. In contrast to the
full set of regulations normally applicable to hazardous wastes under Subtitle
C, these reduced requirements can be understood as "C Minus" regulation.
Among other problems, C Minus regulation requires that the waste be
classified as hazardous, and thus does not avoid stigmatization.
Second, EPA has considered developing regulatory requirements under
Subtitle D of RCRA. Subtitle D authorizes EPA to develop certain
regulations relating to the management of non-hazardous solid wastes, and
EPA has suggested it could develop "D Plus" regulations applicable to
specific types of non-hazardous wastes as an alternative to regulating these
wastes as hazardous. EPA has concluded, however, that there are substantial
legal obstacles, primarily related to federal enforcement, that limit the
effectiveness of federal regulation under Subtitle D.
Finally, EPA has recently focused on a new technique for regulating
wastes that avoids hazardous waste classification. Under the general
approach called "contingent management" or "conditional exemption, 4 EPA
has exempted wastes from classification as hazardous waste on the condition
that the waste is managed in a particular manner specified by regulation. The
ultimate "bootstrap," contingent management regulates non-hazardous
wastes under Subtitle C that EPA could not directly regulate under Subtitle
D. Perhaps more startling, the use of contingent management may allow EPA
to avoid disposal requirements that would otherwise be mandatory for
hazardous wastes. Although at least one court has claimed to uphold the
legality of the contingent management approach, 5 the basic legal questions,
in fact, have not been addressed. The legality of contingent management is
3
EPA has stated that the full Subtitle C regulatory program is "highly prescriptive and
provides little tailoring for site specific conditions." 64 Fed. Reg. 45,632, 45,642 (1999).
4
EPA appears to use the terms interchangeably, but there may actually be a distinction. See
infra note 86. This article will use the generic term "contingent management."
5
Military Toxics Project v. EPA, 146 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See infra notes 109-14 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
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questionable, at best.
Viewed in its most favorable light, contingent management involves
EPA's attempt to develop a rational set of tailored regulations appropriate to
the environmental risk posed by the waste in question. Viewed less
favorably, contingent management may involve EPA's attempt to inject
considerations, including cost and stigma, into its hazardous waste regulatory
decisions in a manner not authorized by RCRA.6 Viewed least favorably,
contingent management involves EPA's attempt to respond to political
pressure from members of the regulated community who resist the full
application of RCRA requirements. In fact, all of these factors are no doubt
at work in EPA's efforts to develop alternative regulatory schemes for "not
very hazardous" waste.
The purpose of this article is to explore the legality and wisdom of
EPA's use of contingent management as a regulatory tool under RCRA. The
article begins with an analysis of the criteria under RCRA for the
classification of materials as solid waste and hazardous waste. The
jurisdictional scope of RCRA hinges on these classifications, and EPA
claims that contingent management is largely justified as an application of
these criteria. Section II of the article addresses the costs and consequences
of three more conventional approaches to "not very hazardous" waste
regulation under RCRA: full Subtitle C, Subtitle C Minus, and Subtitle D
Plus.
Sections III, IV, and V discuss EPA's development of contingent
management as a technique for regulating "not very hazardous" waste. These
sections include a discussion of EPA's rationale in adopting the contingent
management approach and the implications and legality of so doing. The
technique of contingent management could have tremendous consequences
for the regulation of hazardous waste. As conceived by EPA, contingent
management, in principle, is not limited to "not very hazardous" wastes but
rather could subsume all of the regulatory requirements of RCRA. Since the
legality of contingent management is far from clear, the article discusses the
appropriateness of judicial deference to EPA's interpretation.
Section VI offers a suggestion for "rationalizing" EPA's approach to the
regulation of hazardous waste. It argues that it would be preferable for EPA
to eschew the use of contingent management and adopt distinct categories of
hazardous waste. As an extension of its existing regulations, EPA should
maintain three categories of wastes, each subject to its own regulatory
requirements. First, EPA should establish a class of hazardous wastes subject
6
See infra notes 133-135 for a discussion of the role of cost in hazardous waste listing
decisions and notes 64-65 for a discussion of the role of cost in developing hazardous waste management

standards.
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to full Subtitle C requirements. Second, EPA should retain the class of
recyclable materials currently subject to its own distinct set of requirements.
Third, EPA should create a new class of special wastes subject to a reduced
C Minus set of regulations. Such an approach would satisfy EPA's legitimate
concerns without raising the troubling legal issues associated with contingent
management.
I.

Classification of Solid Waste and Hazardous Waste

Federal regulation of solid wastes under RCRA generally follows an allor-nothing approach. Solid wastes that are classified as hazardous are subject
to extensive regulatory controls under Subtitle C; 7 non-hazardous solid
wastes, in general, are not.' Thus, understanding EPA's regulatory options
under RCRA starts with the issue of classification of wastes as hazardous or
non-hazardous.
A.

The Definitions of Solid Waste

As implemented by EPA, there are two applicable definitions of solid
waste under RCRA, the so-called "dual definitions." 9 First, the statutory
7
See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of conventional regulation of
hazardous wastes under RCRA.
8
However, at least one class of non-hazardous waste, recycled used oil, may be regulated
under Subtitle C. See 42 U.S.C. § 6935 (2000). See infra notes 66-84 and accompanying text for a
discussion of regulation of non-hazardous waste under RCRA. The volume of non-hazardous waste
dwarfs that of hazardous waste. In 1988, EPA estimated that II billion tons of non-hazardous industrial
and municipal waste were generated in the U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY
RESPONSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL IN THE UNITED STATES, EPA/530-SW-88-

01IB (Oct. 1988). In contrast, EPA reported that regulated hazardous waste generators produced
approximately 40.7 million tons of RCRA hazardous waste. EPA, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND
EMERGENCY RESPONSE, NATIONAL BIENNIAL RCRA HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT, EPA/530-S-99-036

at ES-6 (Sept. 1999). Despite limited regulation of this non-hazardous waste by the federal government,
the environmental consequence of its disposal is unclear. First, the overwhelming quantities of industrial
non-hazardous waste included in these estimates are sludges generated from the treatment of industrial
process wastewaters. Those sludges are subject to some regulation under the Clean Water Act. Second,
significant amounts of this waste are disposed of in Municipal Solid Waste Landfills (MSWLFs) that are
subject to federal regulation under Subtitle D. As discussed below, Congress, in a crucial amendment to
RCRA in 1984, gave EPA direct federal authority to enforce compliance with Subtitle D MSWLF criteria.
See infra
note 74. Third, EPA has also established regulations for the disposal of a limited class of wastes
produced by "conditionally exempt small quantity generators." 40 C.F.R. § 261.5 (2000). Finally, most
states have some programs that regulate the disposal of non-hazardous industrial solid waste not otherwise
subject to federal regulation under Subtitle C. See JEFFREY M. GABA & DONALD W. STEVER, THE LAW
OF SOLID WASTE, POLLUTION PREVENTION AND RECYCLING, § 10.02 (1999).

9
See Connecticut Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1314
(2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the distinction between the regulatory definition of solid waste for purposes of
Subtitle C and the statutory definition applied to an "imminent and substantial endangerment" action
under § 7003). The coherence of this dual definition has broken down as EPA has used the concept of
contingent management to establish regulatory definitions of solid waste that apply to non-Subtitle C
wastes. In its Military Munitions Rule, for example, EPA has now established a "contingent" definition of
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definition of solid wastes directly applies to identify those wastes that are
subject to regulation as non-hazardous solid wastes under Subtitle D and §
7003 of RCRA.10 Section 1004(27) defines these "solid wastes" to include
certain types of pollution control wastes and "other discarded material,
including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material, resulting
from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations and from
community activities.... "" In general, application of this definition has not
created many difficulties. There are no requirements that a solid waste
exhibit some threshold of toxicity or environmental hazard. Rather, the key
phrase in the statutory definition is "discarded materials," and materials that
are obviously thrown away or abandoned meet this description.
Second, solid wastes, for purposes of hazardous waste regulation under
Subtitle C, are defined in a complex regulatory definition first promulgated
by EPA in 1985.12 These regulatory solid wastes include materials that are
abandoned, recycled, or designated as "inherently waste-like." 3 In practice,
application of EPA's regulatory definition of solid waste can be extremely
difficult.' 4 Indeed, interpretation of the definition may be more of an art than

a science, and this definition is widely regarded as one of the most complex
and confusing regulations in a field not generally known for its clarity.' 5

non-hazardous solid waste, in lieu of the statutory definition, for purposes of applying the "imminent and
substantial endangerment" provisions of § 7003. See 40 C.F.R. § 266.202.
10
See 40 C.F.R. § 257.2 (2000) (codifying statutory definition of solid waste for purposes of
sanitary landfill criteria under Subtitle D); § 261.1(b)(2)(ii) (section 7003 is governed by statutory
elements); Comite Pro Rescate De La Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 888 F.2d 180 (1st
Cir. 1989) (discussing application of statutory definition of solid waste under §§ 7002-7003). See infra
notes 66-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirements of Subtitle D and § 7003.
Additionally, EPA claims that the statutory definition applies for purposes of inspection and monitoring
authority under §§ 3007 and 3013.40 C.F.R. § 261.l(b)(2)(i).
11 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). The statutory definition also contains certain exemptions from
classification as solid waste including domestic sewage, industrial discharges regulated under the Clean
Water Act, and certain nuclear material. Id.
12
40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a). This definition applies solely for purposes of determining materials
that are hazardous wastes to be regulated under Subtitle C. Id. § 261.1(b)(1) ("The definition of solid
waste contained in [Part 261] applies only to wastes that also are hazardous for purposes of the regulations
implementing subtitle C of RCRA.").
Id. § 261.2(a)(2). In general, abandoned wastes are materials that are thrown away or
13
otherwise permanently discarded. See id. § 261.2(b). Recycled wastes are materials that meet a complex
test EPA developed to identify those types of recycling that warrant regulation under RCRA. Id. §
261.2(c). Inherently waste-like materials include a very limited number of materials that EPA has
specifically designated as wastes. Id. § 261.2(d).
14
See generally Jeffrey M. Gaba, Separating Chaff from Wheat: Solid Waste and Recycled
Materials Under RCRA, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 623, 666 (1989) (arguing that, "given the structure and
contradictory objectives of the statute and the complexity of the problem, there was virtually no way that
the Agency could have developed a clear, comprehensive, and rational definition").
15
See, e.g., United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (holding that plaintiff
could be prosecuted for violating hazardous waste regulations, despite plaintiff's arguments that the
regulations violated due process because of their vagueness).
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Classificationof Hazardous Waste

Hazardous wastes under Subtitle C are a subset of regulatory solid
wastes that either exhibit a hazard characteristic or have been listed as
hazardous by EPA.16 Additionally, through application of the mixture,
derived-from, and contained-in rules, otherwise non-hazardous wastes may
be classified as hazardous if they contain or are derived from a hazardous
waste.
1.

Characteristic Hazardous Wastes

A solid waste may be classified as a hazardous waste if it exhibits any
one of four hazard characteristics promulgated by EPA: ignitability,
corrosivity, reactivity and toxicity.' 7 The characteristic of ignitability
measures the waste's ability, obviously enough, to catch fire. 8 The
characteristic of corrosivity identifies wastes that are extremely acidic or
basic.' 9 The characteristic of reactivity identifies wastes that may explode or
otherwise be reactive and unstable.2 ° The characteristic of toxicity identifies
those wastes that contain components that could be released into the
environment at levels posing a risk to health or the environment. 2' A waste
exhibits the toxicity characteristic, however, only if a liquid extract of the
waste contains one of thirty-eight listed constituents above defined
regulatory levels.22
Any waste may exhibit a hazard characteristic, and it is the
responsibility of the generator to determine-either through testing the waste
or by guessing (otherwise known as applying "knowledge of process")whether a waste exhibits such a characteristic.2 3
16
RCRA defines a "hazardous waste" as a solid waste which 1) causes or significantly
contributes to risk of death or serious disease or 2) may "pose a substantial present or potential hazard to
human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or
otherwise managed." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (2000). Additionally, § 3001(a) requires EPA to develop
criteria for identifying the characteristics of or listing hazardous waste "which should be subject to the
provisions" of Subtitle C taking into account certain factors relating to the waste's toxicity. 42 U.S.C. §
6921 (a).
17
40 C.F.R. § 261.20 (2000).
18
Id. § 261.21.
19
Id. § 261.22.
20
Id. § 261.23.
21
Id. § 261.24.
22
Id. § 261.24 tbl. 1. EPA also specifies a procedure, known as the Toxicity Characteristic
Leachate Procedure (TCLP), for generating a liquid extract from a solid waste. § 261.24(a). Only if the
extract of the waste contains high enough levels of the constituents will the waste exhibit the toxicity
characteristic. Id. Thus, a waste containing pure dioxin would not exhibit the toxicity characteristic since
dioxin is not one of the thirty-eight listed constituents.
23
Id. § 262.11.
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2.

Listed Hazardous Wastes

EPA has designated or listed certain solid wastes as hazardous wastes. 4
A waste that falls within the listing description is automatically classified as
a hazardous waste and the generator need not test it. In general, only through
a petition to EPA to "de-list" the waste can a listed hazardous waste shed its
classification.25
EPA has promulgated regulations, found at 40 C.F.R. § 261.11, that
specify the criteria it uses to determine whether to list a waste as hazardous.
Under § 261.11, a waste may be listed as hazardous if it meets any one of
three criteria. 26 Under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2), a waste may be listed if
it exhibits a hazard characteristic 27 or satisfies certain criteria establishing a
high level of toxicity. 28 Few hazardous wastes, however, have been listed
29
solely based on these criteria.
Subsection (a)(3) contains the criteria by which most wastes have been
listed. Under this subsection, a waste may be listed if it contains one of a
large number of designated hazardous constituents-the "Appendix VIII"
constituents-and EPA concludes that the waste is "capable of posing a
substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment
when improperly treated, stored, transported or disposed of, or otherwise
managed., 30 The subsection further specifies a series of balancing factors to
be assessed in making this determination. 3' These balancing factors relate to
24
EPA has published three different lists of wastes. Id. § 261.31 (wastes from non-specific
sources, such as certain spent solvents), Id. §261.32 (wastes from specific sources, such as certain wastes
form the petroleum refining industry), Id. § 261.33 (discarded commercial chemical products).
25
Id. § 261.4(d)(2). Under the mixture and derived from rules, even wastes containing only
small amounts of listed waste will be classified as a listed hazardous waste. See infra notes 36-38 and
accompanying notes for a discussion of these rules.
26
Id. § 261.11.
27
Id. § 261.11 (a)(1).
28
Id. § 261.1 l(a)(2). Under subsection (a)(2), a waste may be listed if the waste itself is fatal
to humans at low doses, meets certain levels of animal toxicity, or is capable of causing "an increase in
serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness." Wastes listed on this basis are designated as
"Acute Hazardous Waste." Id.
Id. §§ 261.31-.33. EPA's lists contain codes specifying the basis on which wastes are listed.
29
Only a few wastes, primarily those related to munitions, have been listed solely because they exhibit a
characteristic. A limited number of wastes have been listed in § 261.31 because they are acutely
hazardous. Consistent with the overall clarity of EPA hazardous waste regulations, acutely hazardous
wastes are identified by the waste code (H). See id. §261.30.
Id. §261.1 l(a)(3).
30
31
The subsection (a)(3) factors are:
The nature of the toxicity presented by the constituent.
(i)
(ii) The concentration of the constituent in the waste.
(iii) The potential of the constituent or any toxic degradation product of the constituent to
migrate from the waste into the environment under the types of improper
management considered in paragraph (a)(3)(vii) of this section.
(iv) The persistence of the constituent or any toxic degradation productof the constituent.
(v)
The potential for the constituent or any toxic degradation product of the constituent to
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the waste's toxicity, plausible mismanagement scenarios, action taken by
other government agencies or "other factors as may be appropriate. '32
In contrast to the application of the hazard characteristics, there is no
simple numerical standard for the listing of hazardous wastes; application of
the criteria in 40 C.F.R. § 261.11, particularly application of the balancing
factors in subsection (a)(3), involves an exercise of judgment by EPA.33 EPA
has claimed that it does not have a mandatory duty to list a waste that may
satisfy the listing criteria, and courts have generally been deferential to
EPA's judgment.34 However, courts have required an adequate justification
of EPA's assessment of the criteria.35
3.

Mixture, Derived-from, and Contained-in Rules

Wastes also may be "transformed" into hazardous wastes based on their
contact with a listed hazardous waste. Under EPA's mixture rule, mixtures of
listed hazardous wastes and non-hazardous wastes are classified as hazardous
degrade into non-harmful constituents and the rate of degradation.
The degree to which the constituent or any degradation product of the constituent
bioaccumulates in ecosystems.
(vii) The plausible types of improper management to which the waste could be subjected.
(viii) The quantities of the waste generated at individual generation sites or on a regional or
national basis.
(ix) The nature and severity of the human health and environmental damage that has
occurred as a result of the improper management of wastes containing the constituent.
Action taken by other governmental agencies or regulatory programs based on the
(x)
health or environmental hazard posed by the waste or waste constituent.
(xi) Such other factors as may be appropriate.
(vi)

Id.
32
Wastes listed on this basis are designated as "toxic wastes." Id. It is important to note that
wastes that are listed as toxic wastes are not listed because they exhibit the toxicity characteristic. A waste
may be listed as a toxic waste on a far broader basis than that used by generators to determine if a waste
exhibits the toxicity characteristic. Id.
33
In 1994, in the preamble to a particular listing decision, EPA published a "Hazardous Waste
Listing Determination Policy" in which it described "the general approach the Agency uses for
determining whether to list waste as hazardous pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 261.11(a)(3)." 59 Fed. Reg.
66,072, 66,073 (1994).
34
See, e.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 37,284, 37,288 (1992) (EPA statement of listing discretion); Envtl.
Def. Fund v. EPA, 852 F.2d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1063
(D.C. Cir. 1994), the court rejected a claim that EPA has a mandatory duty to list wastes that exhibit a
hazard characteristic and thus satisfy the (a)(1) criterion. The court stated further that EPA had discretion
whether or not to list a waste under subsection (a)(3). Id. at 1069. The court wrote that "[s]uch a choice
seems particularly reasonable with respect to the subsection (a)(3) criterion, whose multi-factor balancing
test still leaves a great deal of room for the exercise of agency expertise." Id.
See, e.g., American Mining Congress v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (remanding
35
the relisting of certain metal smelting wastes because EPA failed to offer an adequate explanation of its
response to certain technical data). Additionally, courts have limited EPA's consideration to the listed
factors. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Courts
have held that EPA must address each of these factors in making its listing decisions. See, e.g.,
Dithiocarbamate Task Force v. EPA, 98 F.3d 1394, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Natural Res. Def. Council v.
EPA, 25 F.3d 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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even if they contain only small quantities of hazardous constituents and do
not exhibit a hazard characteristic.36 Under the derived-from rule, wastes that
are generated from the treatment of listed wastes are classified as hazardous
regardless of their current toxicity. 37 Finally, under EPA's contained-in rule,
certain wastes, such as soil or groundwater, generated from the remediation
of hazardous waste sites may be classified as hazardous if they contain some
unspecified quantity of listed wastes.38
These rules greatly expand the potential universe of wastes that are
technically classified as hazardous but may not pose an environmental threat.
In fact, application of these rules may be among the most significant
consequences of listing a waste as hazardous since listed wastes, unlike
characteristic hazardous wastes or non-hazardous wastes, have the power to
transform other wastes into hazardous wastes.
II.

Conventional RCRA Regulation and its Discontents

A.

Full Regulation under Subtitle C

Solid wastes that are classified as hazardous, either by listing or by
exhibiting a hazard characteristic, are normally subject to extensive and
expensive regulations under Subtitle C of RCRA. 39 Subtitle C establishes
what is routinely described as a "cradle to grave" system that regulates
hazardous wastes from their point of generation to their final disposal. 40 The
central elements of this regulatory scheme include certain on-site
management and storage restrictions on generators,41 manifest obligations
that require tracking of transported wastes,42 land disposal restrictions,43 and
an obligation to dispose of the hazardous waste only at a facility that satisfies
36
40 C.F.R.§ 261.3(a)(2)(iii)-(iv). Mixtures of characteristic (as opposed to listed) hazardous
waste and non-hazardous waste are classified as hazardous only if the resulting mixture exhibits a hazard
characteristic. See generally GABA & STEVER, supra note 8, § 2.05.
37
40 C.F.R. § 261.3(c)(2)(i) (2000). Wastes generated from the treatment of hazard
characteristic wastes are not classified as hazardous unless the derived from waste itself exhibits a hazard
characteristic. Id.
This contained-in interpretation applies largely as a result of a series of EPA statements and
38
guidance documents. EPA has formally promulgated this provision only with respect to a very limited
class of "debris." See GABA & STEVER, supra note 8, § 2.05[4].
39
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 262 (2000) (requirements applicable to hazardous waste generators); §
263 (transporter requirements); § 264 (requirements applicable to treatment, storage and disposal
facilities); § 265 (requirements applicable to "interim status" treatment, storage and disposal facilities).
40

See, e.g., DONALD W. STEVER, LAW OF CHEMICAL REGULATION AND HAZARDOUS WASTE

§§ 5.03-.07 (2000).
40 C.F.R. §§ 262.10-.44 (2000).
41
42
Id. §§ 262.20-.23.
43
Id. §§ 268.1-.50.
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Subtitle C requirements, known as "treatment, storage, or disposal facilities"
or "TSDFs." 4 TSDFs generally must obtain a federally mandated RCRA
permit, and to obtain this permit, facilities must meet a variety of technical
and financial criteria. 45 For generators, perhaps the most significant costs
from RCRA stem from the requirement to dispose of wastes only at a
permitted facility. For disposal facilities, including industries that seek to
dispose of wastes on-site, there are substantial costs associated with the
TSDF permit requirements.
B.

Reduced Regulatory Obligations under Subtitle C. Subtitle C Minus

Since the inception of the RCRA program, EPA has either applied or
proposed to apply reduced requirements to certain types of hazardous wastes
or hazardous waste management practices. These include:
Recycled Wastes. Since 1980, EPA has imposed reduced requirements on
hazardous wastes that are recycled in certain ways. 46 These requirements
eliminate some of the basic elements of the full Subtitle C program. 47
Universal Wastes. In order to encourage the recycling of certain wastes, EPA
in 1995 promulgated a reduced set of requirements applicable to certain
persons who generate or store a limited class of so-called universal wastes,
48
including batteries, pesticides, and mercury-containing thermostats.
Persons who actually recycle or dispose of these wastes,
however, remain
49
subject to the full set of hazardous waste requirements.
Waste Samples and Treatability Study Samples. EPA has established separate
and reduced requirements for hazardous wastes that are collected for
purposes of testing to determine the waste's "characteristic or composition"
(waste samples) or for conducting "treatability studies" (treatability study
44
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2000) (making it a crime to knowingly treat, store or dispose of a
hazardous waste without a permit).
45
Id. §§ 6925-6926; 40 C.F.R. §§ 264-265 (containing the regulatory requirements that must
be satisfied to obtain a RCRA permit authorizing operation as a "treatment, storage or disposal facility").
46
E.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 266 (containing tailored requirements applicable to wastes recycled by
"use constituting disposal"); 266.20-.23 (involving some forms of land application such as use of wastes
in fertilizers); 266.70 (detailing reclamation of precious metals); 266.80 (discussing spent lead-acid
batteries); 266.100-.122 (regarding the burning of wastes in boilers and industrial furnaces). Boiler and
industrial furnaces, for example, are subject to different permit requirements and emission limitations than
those that would apply to a hazardous waste incinerator. Id
47
EPA, in March 2000, also relaxed the storage requirements for certain types of electroplating
sludges that are recycled. EPA claimed the authority to establish these reduced requirements for the
sludges based on arguments that the new requirements will encourage recycling while protecting "public
health and the environment." 65 Fed. Reg. 12,378, 12,380-83 (2000).
48
40 C.F.R. §§ 273.1-.56 (1999).
49
See generally GABA & STEVER, supra note 8, at § 9.12.
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samples).50
Special Wastes. In 1978, EPA proposed the creation of a class of special
wastes that would be subject to reduced regulatory requirements. These
special wastes would have consisted of certain low-toxicity and high-volume
wastes including cement kiln dust, utility waste, mining wastes and oil and
gas production wastes. 1 This proposal generated "widespread and divergent
protest from the regulated community and the public," 2 and EPA abandoned
the distinct classification of special wastes when it adopted its current system
of hazardous waste classification.53 Congress subsequently adopted specific
statutory requirements applicable to these wastes.54
EPA has consistently claimed the authority to adopt reduced
requirements for hazardous waste under Subtitle C. 5 EPA's rationale for
these C Minus regulations appears to be that the reduced requirements satisfy
the statutory standard of protection of "human health and the environment. 56
This justification has been based on the minimal environmental threat from
the wastes, the existence of other economic and regulatory incentives for
proper management, and concerns that additional restrictions will discourage
recycling. 7
There are, however, a number of problems with this approach. First, this
approach requires that the waste first be designated as hazardous. To the
extent that EPA and the regulated community fear the stigma of hazardous
waste classification, C Minus regulation does not avoid the problem.
Second, there are specific statutory requirements applicable to the
disposal of hazardous waste that may not be eliminated by EPA. Although
EPA is authorized to establish such requirements "as may be necessary to
protect human health and the environment, 5 8 there are elements of
50
40 C.F.R. §§ 261.4(d) (waste samples), 261.4(e) (treatability study samples) (2000). EPA
has characterized these rules as "conditional exemptions." 53 Fed. Reg. 27,290 (1998). They are not. The
wastes subject to these rules remain classified as hazardous waste, but they are subject to specific, and less
stringent, regulation.
51
43 Fed. Reg. 58,946 (1978).
52
45 Fed. Reg. 33,174 (1980).
53
45 Fed. Reg. at 33,173-75. Among other things, EPA stated that the new toxicity and
corrosivity characteristics would cause fewer of these wastes to be classified as hazardous. Id.
54
See generally GABA & STEVER, supra note 8, §§ 6.01-6.06.
55
In its recent proposal to establish contingent management requirements for cement kiln dust,
EPA, for example, identified development of "tailored standards under Subtitle C" as a regulatory
alternative. 64 Fed. Reg. 45,632-41 (1999).
56
See infra note 65.
57
See, e.g., 65 Fed. Reg. 12,380-83 (2000) (justification for reduced regulation of
electroplating sludges); 46 Fed. Reg. 47,426 (1981) (justification for reduced requirements for waste and
treatability study samples).
58
42 U.S.C. § 6922(a) (2000) (standard applicable to generator requirements); § 6923(a)
(standard applicable to transporter requirements). Section 3004(a) of RCRA also establishes a general
standard that requirements for TSDFs be "necessary to protect human health and the environment." §
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regulation under Subtitle C that are mandated by statute. Under §§ 3004(b)(k) and (m), for example, certain forms of land disposal of hazardous waste
are prohibited by statute, unless they comply with regulatory requirements
established by EPA.5 9 There are also a number of statutorily prescribed
conditions on TSDFs, including "minimum technological requirements" for
certain types of waste disposal,6 ° and substantial financial responsibility
obligations.61 The statute also imposes a "corrective action" requirement-an
obligation to remediate past releases of solid wastes-on facilities obtaining
a TSDF permit.6 2 The legislative history of RCRA indicates that Congress
intended these mandatory provisions as a limitation on EPA's discretion to
fashion a regulatory program under RCRA.63
Third, Subtitle C does not give EPA the express authority to consider
cost in developing regulations. 64 The basic statutory standard is protection of
human health and the environment, and Congress has, only in limited cases,
expressly authorized EPA to consider cost as a factor in its regulatory
decisions.65 This seems to place substantial limits on EPA's ability to tailor
regulations based on concerns for the cost of full Subtitle C regulation. Any
justification of reduced requirements would presumably have to be limited to
claims that the public health and environment were adequately protected
with reduced regulation.
C.

Subtitle D and Subtitle D Plus

Subtitle D is that portion of RCRA most directly applicable to the
regulation of non-hazardous solid waste.66 Two elements of RCRA form the
6924(a). The section, however, specifies seven general requirements that must be included. §§ 6922(a),
6923(a), 6924(a).
59
See generally GABA & STEVER, supra note 8, § 3.04 for a discussion of "land disposal
restrictions" and the "land ban."
60
42 U.S.C. § 6924(o).
61
Id. § 6924(t).
62
Id. §6924(u).
63
See infra notes 138-139.
64
EPA has apparently concluded that it does not have the authority to consider the cost of
regulation in establishing disposal standards. In its "Regulatory Determination" not to list certain mining
wastes as hazardous, EPA stated that its general authority under § 3004(a) to establish such standards does
not include the "flexibility to consider the economic impact of regulation." 51 Fed. Reg. 24,496, 24,500
(1986). See also Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 852 F.2d 1309, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting EPA's
conclusion that § 3004(a) does not grant authority to consider the economic impact of regulation).
65
Section 3004(x), for example, provides special authority to regulate "hazardous" mining
wastes based on consideration of the cost of regulation. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(x). Section 4010(c) allows EPA
to "take into account the practicable capability" of facilities in developing criteria for Municipal Solid
Waste Landfills receiving certain types of hazardous waste. 42 U.S.C. § 6949a(c). In Sierra Club v. EPA,
992 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1993), however, the court held that the statute required development of
groundwater monitoring standards for all landfills, and that this consideration could not be waived based
on consideration of cost.
66
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, §§ 4001-4010, 42 U.S.C. §§
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basis for control of non-hazardous waste under Subtitle D. First, Subtitle D
contains a federal prohibition on the open dumping of non-hazardous solid
waste.6 7 Second, two provisions of RCRA, §§ 1008(a)(3) and 4004(a),
authorize EPA to define acts that constitute open dumping through
establishment of "sanitary landfill criteria., 68 EPA has promulgated sanitary
landfill criteria that form the base program under Subtitle D.69
Given the apparent breadth of this authority, EPA has suggested that it
might regulate some classes of "not very hazardous" waste by establishing
tailored sanitary landfill criteria for specific solid wastes. 70 These would be
Subtitle D Plus requirements, and violation of these requirements would
constitute prohibited open dumping.
There is, however, a significant problem with basing a federal
regulatory scheme on Subtitle D. The open dumping prohibition, although
enforceable by states 71 and private citizens, 72 is not directly enforceable by
6941-6949a (2000). Subtitle D has a variety of interrelated provisions that establish minimal requirements
for the disposal of non-hazardous solid wastes. See generally GABA & STEVER, supra note 8, at § 3.02.
67
42 U.S.C. § 6945(a).
68
Under § 1008(a)(3), EPA must develop guidelines to provide minimum criteria to be used by
States to define "open-dumping." 42 U.S.C. § 6907(a)(3). Under § 4004(a), EPA is authorized to
promulgate regulations to determine "which facilities shall be classified as sanitary landfills and which
shall be classified as open dumps." Id. § 6944(a). The 4004(a) regulations are to be based on the standard
of "no reasonable probability of adverse effects on human health or the environment." Id. EPA is also
authorized to classify different types of sanitary landfills. Id.
In 1984, Congress provided additional authority for EPA to establish criteria for facilities receiving
household hazardous waste and hazardous wastes from conditionally exempt small quantity generators.
Id. § 6949a(c). In establishing these criteria, EPA may consider not only the need to protect "human
health and the environment" but also the "practicable capability of such facilities." This apparently allows
consideration of economic factors not explicitly recognized under the standards in §§ 1008(a)(3) and
4004(a). EPA, in reliance on this authority, has established detailed and stringent requirements applicable
to Municipal Solid Waste Landfills (MSWLFs). See 40 C.F.R. §§ 258.1-.75 (1999). EPA has also
promulgated criteria applicable to a limited class of non-municipal landfills that receive wastes from
Conditionally Exempt Small Quantity Generators (CESQGs). Id. §§ 257.5-.30.
69
Under the authorities of §§ 1008(a)(3) and 4004(a), EPA has established general criteria
defining "sanitary landfills" in 40 C.F.R. §§ 257.1-.4.
70
See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 27,300 (1991) (discussing the use of Subtitle D Plus requirements for
certain mining wastes); 53 Fed. Reg. 25,456 (1988) (discussing alternatives for regulating certain oil and
gas production wastes that it excluded from classification as hazardous); 51 Fed. Reg. 24,496, 24,500
(1986) (discussing use of Subtitle D for mining wastes).
71
States are required, as part of their "state management plans," to prohibit open-dumping, see
40 C.F.R. § 256.23, and violations of this requirement should be enforceable in state courts as a matter of
state law. EPA, however, has apparently disclaimed the authority to compel states to adopt enforceable
state equivalents of specific Subtitle D standards. In a recent description of its regulatory options, EPA
wrote that it may "encourage States to adopt standards developed under Subtitle D as enforceable
standards under State law, but the Agency could not compel them to do so." 64 Fed. Reg. 45,632-40
(1999).
72
Early case law split over whether citizens could use the citizen suit provisions in §
7002(a)(l)(A) to sue persons alleged to be in violation of the § 4005(a) federal open-dumping prohibition.
In O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, 523 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. Pa. 1981), for example, the court held that a
federal citizen suit could be brought directly against persons in violation of § 4005(a). Id. at 654. In
contrast, the court in City of Gallatin v. Cherokee County, 563 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Tex. 1983), held that
the open-dumping prohibition could not be enforced through a citizen suit.
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the federal government.7 3 Although RCRA contains significant civil and
criminal penalties, they generally only apply for violation of the hazardous
waste provisions of Subtitle C.74 EPA has identified the lack of enforcement
authority as the primary problem with adopting a regulatory scheme based on
Subtitle D Plus standards.75
There are several issues, in addition to federal enforcement, that may
limit the application of a Subtitle D Plus approach. First, there is the basic
question of whether EPA has the authority to develop sanitary landfill
criteria applicable to specific classes of non-hazardous waste. Section
4004(a) specifically authorizes criteria to "provide for the classification of
different types of sanitary landfills, '' 76 and this certainly implies the
discretion to develop different criteria applicable to different types of wastes.
Although § 1008(a)(3) is less clear on the standards for sanitary landfill
criteria, what guidance is given seems to allow for variation in standards
based on the characteristics of the landfill rather than the waste.77 EPA has
consistently claimed, however, the authority to establish tailored Subtitle D
Congress resolved this issue by amending § 4005 in 1984 specifically to authorize citizen suits
under § 7002 against persons in violation of the open-dumping prohibition. The 1984 Amendment added
the following sentence to § 4005(a): "The prohibition contained in the preceding sentence [the federal
open-dumping prohibition] shall be enforceable under § 6972 of this Title against persons engaged in an
act of open -dumping."
Congress also apparently precluded citizen suits against states or the federal government to compel
enforcement of the open-dumping prohibition. See H.R. Rep. No. 198, at 53-4, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5612-13. Courts had previously reached different conclusions on this issue. Compare
Ringbolt Farms Homeowner's Ass'n v. Town of Hull, 714 F. Supp. 1246 (D. Mass. 1989) (citizen suits
not authorized against state for state's failure to enforce the prohibition) with City of Gallatin v. Cherokee
County, 563 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Tex. 1983) (citizen suit may "perhaps" be brought against EPA or a state
for failure to enforce).
73
In the preamble to its "Open Dumping" section, EPA wrote: "The Federal Prohibition may
be enforced in Federal District court through the citizen suit provisions in Section 7002 of RCRA. The
Act does not give EPA authority to take legal action against parties that may violate the open-dumping
prohibition." 46 Fed. Reg. 29,064 (1981). EPA continues to hold this interpretation of the statute. See,
e.g., 64 Fed. Reg. 45,632, 45,640 (1999) (stating that standards developed under Subtitle D "would not be
directly enforceable by EPA under the enforcement authorities of §§ 3007 and 3008").
74
Section 3008(a), for example, authorizes EPA to issue compliance orders for violation of
"this subchapter" (i.e. Subtitle C). 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (2000). Section 3008(d) authorizes criminal
prosecution of persons who violate certain requirements relating to "hazardous waste identified or listed
under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d). In recognition of this limitation on enforcement authority,
Congress amended RCRA in 1984 specifically to allow federal enforcement of two specific types of
Subtitle D criteria. Section 4005(c) now provides that the federal government may, using the authority §
3008, bring a federal action to enforce the open-dumping prohibition against violation of MSWLF and
CESQG criteria in states that have not developed approved programs for these facilities. 42 U.S.C. §
6945(c)(2).
75
See, e.g., 64 Fed. Reg. 45,632, 45,640 (1999).
76
42 U.S.C. § 6944(a).
77
Section 1008(a) guidelines, in general, are described as including "minimum information for
use in deciding the adequate location, design, and construction of facilities associated with solid waste
management practices including the consideration of regional, geographic, demographic, and climatic
factors." Id. § 6907(a).
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Plus requirements. 78
Second, for wastes that otherwise might be classified as hazardous,
there is the issue of whether EPA may elect to regulate under Subtitle D in
lieu of Subtitle C. In Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA,79 the court held
that EPA could decline to regulate certain mining wastes as hazardous and
rely instead on regulation under Subtitle D. 80 This conclusion, however, was
based in part on RCRA provisions that specifically address this class of
mining wastes. Therefore, the Environmental Defense Fund opinion should
not be read to suggest that EPA has general authority to base a listing
decision on its preference for regulation under Subtitle D rather than C. At
least one court, however, has upheld an EPA decision declining to list a
waste based on the existence of regulatory programs established by other
regulatory agencies. 8 ' Thus, a limited extension of these cases supports the
conclusion that EPA could decline to regulate a waste as hazardous due to
the existence of other regulations legally adopted under Subtitle D.
D. Imminent and SubstantialEndangermentunder Section 7003
There is an additional provision that authorizes limited federal control
over disposal of non-hazardous wastes. Under § 7003, EPA may issue an
administrative order or the government may seek injunctive relief to prevent
"an imminent and substantial endangerment" arising from the management
or disposal of "any solid waste or hazardous waste. ' 2 EPA and the courts
have concluded that this authority extends to the broad statutorily defined
class of solid wastes.8 3 Violations of 7003 administrative orders are
punishable by fines of up to $5,000 per day. Although this fine is
substantially less than the penalties available for violations of Subtitle C, it
does constitute a mechanism for federal enforcement, at least on a case-bycase basis, of activities that constitute the mismanagement of non-hazardous
solid waste 8 4
78
In its decision to regulate certain mining wastes under Subtitle D rather than Subtitle C, EPA
recognized that the existing Part 257 criteria were "not appropriate" for mining wastes. The Agency
stated, however, that it "believes that it can design and implement a program specific to mining wastes
under Subtitle D that addresses the risks associated with such waste." 51 Fed. Reg. 24,496, 24,500 (1986).
EPA has made similar statements with respect to regulation of oil and gas exploration and production
wastes that it has excluded from regulation under Subtitle C. See 53 Fed. Reg. 25,456 (1988).
852 F.2d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
79
80
Although, in fact, EPA did not promulgate specific Subtitle D Plus regulations for these
mining wastes, it did indicate that it might develop such regulations. See 51 Fed. Reg. 24,496 (1986).
81
Natural Resource Defense Council v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (2000).
82
83
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
84

In its military munitions regulation, EPA has stated that it will rely on its authority under §

7003 to address problems related to certain types of military munitions wastes that have been excluded
from the regulatory definition of solid waste. 40 C.F.R. § 266.202(d) (1999).

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 18:85, 2001

III. Regulation by Bootstrap: Contingent Management of "Not Very
Hazardous" Waste
Given the limitations of the Subtitle C, C Minus and D Plus approaches,
EPA has explored various alternatives to regulation under RCRA.85
Increasingly EPA has relied on the questionable technique of contingent
management or conditional exclusion.8 6 Through this approach, EPA has
tried to have it all--enforceable regulation without the cost and stigma of
hazardous waste classification.
A.

The Concept of ContingentManagement

The concept of contingent management is deviously simple, or in EPA's
terms a "creative, affordable and common sense approach." 87 EPA excludes
a waste from classification as hazardous on the condition that it is managed
in compliance with specific regulatory requirements. In other words, EPA
establishes a set of requirements that apply to a waste that, by virtue of the
exclusion, is classified as a non-hazardous solid waste. Non-compliance with
the requirements converts the waste into a hazardous waste, and the party
85
In its 1999 proposal to establish contingent management requirements for cement kiln dust,
EPA provided perhaps its fullest discussion of its possible alternatives for regulation of "not very
hazardous" waste. 64 Fed. Reg. 45, 632, 45,639-43 (1999). In addition to the three major alternatives
discussed in this article, EPA identified several possibilities:
(i)
Adoption of management guidelines to be used by states in adopting their own
enforceable requirements. Under this approach, EPA would adopt a contingent
management requirement only if states elected not to adopt state standards.
(ii) Adoption of a "Memorandum of Understanding" with the affected industry, through
which the industry would voluntarily accept enforceable restrictions. In effect, this
would be an application of an enforceable agreement approach, as previously
suggested by EPA, through which EPA would negotiate the imposition of restrictions
to be accepted through a voluntary agreement (of questionable enforceability) with
industry. See 59 Fed. Reg. 66,079 (1999) (discussing the possible use of "enforceable
agreements" between EPA and industry).
(iii) Use of authority under § 7003 of RCRA to abate an "imminent and substantial
endangerment" arising from the improper management of solid or hazardous waste.
(iv) Enforcement of contingent management standards under Subtitle C without having to
identify the waste as hazardous, as suggested by a trade association.
64 Fed. Reg. 45, 632, 45,639-43 (1999).
86
EPA appears to use the terms interchangeably, but there may actually be a distinction.
Compare 64 Fed. Reg. 46,476-80 (1999) (describing proposed conditional listing of chlorinated aliphatic
wastes as "contingent management") with 64 Fed. Reg. 10,064 (1999) (describing proposed exemption of
mixed low-level radioactive wastes as "conditional exemption."). As discussed above, a waste may be
hazardous either because it exhibits a hazard "characteristic," or because it has been specifically listed as a
hazardous waste by EPA. A contingent management approach would, upon compliance with certain
regulatory requirements, exempt a waste from classification as hazardous regardless of whether the waste
exhibits a characteristic or appears on the list. In contrast, EPA tends to use the label of "conditional
exclusion" to apply to exemptions from classification as a listed waste. This approach is potentially more
limited since it would not exempt characteristic hazardous wastes.
87
64 Fed. Reg. 45,632 (1999).
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who violated the conditional requirements becomes subject to the full
Subtitle C requirements. Thus, EPA achieves regulation and enforcement
without the stigmatizing effects of classification as hazardous waste. EPA
has used or proposed the use of contingent management in a number of
instances. These include:
Hazardous Waste Identification Rule. Perhaps EPA's most comprehensive
proposed use of contingent management has been put forward in a series of
Hazardous Waste Identification Rule (HWIR) proposals. These HWIR
proposals attempt to deal with the problems of the mixture and derived-from
rules by either excluding from hazardous waste classification or
"contingently managing" certain low toxicity listed wastes. Under a 1999
HWIR proposal, EPA would exempt certain types of wastes that exhibit low
levels of identified hazardous constituents if the wastes are disposed of in a
landfill. 8 This idea is a88continuation of EPA's 1995 HWIR proposal, 89 in
which EPA proposed to establish three classes or tiers of wastes. Tier I
wastes would be subject to full regulation as hazardous wastes if they
contained concentrations of designated constituents above certain levels. Tier
II wastes, containing levels of these constituents below the full regulatory
level but above specified "exit" levels, would be excluded from regulation as
hazardous waste if they were disposed of in certain regulated non-hazardous
waste landfills. Tier III wastes, with constituent concentrations below
defined "exit" levels, would be completely excluded from classification as
hazardous waste. The Tier II intermediate wastes would be subject to a
conditional exclusion, being classified as hazardous unless they are managed
in a manner less comprehensive than full Subtitle C regulation.9"
Cement Kiln Dust. In August of 1999, EPA proposed a rule that would
conditionally exempt cement kiln dust from classification as a hazardous
waste if it complied with a series of technical requirements including land
disposal location standards, air emission standards, and groundwater
monitoring and corrective action requirements. 91
ChlorinatedAliphatic Production Wastes. In August of 1999, EPA proposed

88
64 Fed. Reg. 63,382, 63,405 (1999). This is the "landfill-only" proposal. Alternatively, EPA
has proposed a generic exemption that would exclude wastes containing low levels of hazardous
constituents without imposing any federal contingent management requirements. Id. at 63,394.
89
See 60 Fed. Reg. 66,344 (1995).
90
In 1995, EPA also discussed a conditional exemption for certain types of petroleum refinery
wastes. 60 Fed. Reg. 57,749 (1995). EPA considered listing these wastes as hazardous unless they were
managed in a number of different ways that the Agency determines do not pose a significant
environmental risk.
91
64 Fed. Reg. 45,632 (1999).
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to list "conditionally" certain chlorinated aliphatic production wastes.92
Under this proposal, these wastes would not be listed as hazardous if they
were managed in specified types of landfills. 93
Military Munitions. In 1997, EPA promulgated a rule regulating "waste
military munitions" under RCRA.94 As part of this regulation, EPA
established a conditional exemption for storage of non-chemical military
munitions waste. EPA stated that it does not believe that full regulation of
these wastes is necessary when the munitions are handled in compliance with
certain Department of Defense (DOD) requirements and with specific
regulatory conditions established by EPA. Under the conditional exemption,
these wastes are excluded from classification as hazardous if the DOD and
EPA requirements are met.95 The effect of this exemption is, among other
things, to make the DOD and EPA requirements enforceable under RCRA.
B.

Issues in Implementation of a ContingentManagement Approach
1.

Classification as a Hazardous Waste

The contingent management approach is limited; it can be used only for
those wastes that otherwise would be classified as hazardous waste. A waste
can be contingently exempt only if it has previously been classified as a
hazardous waste either through exhibiting a hazard characteristic or by virtue
of being listed. In the absence of a determination that a waste is hazardous, it
is impossible to force a violator to comply with the contingent regulations.
Thus, as a prerequisite to application of contingent management, EPA must
either simultaneously list and contingently exempt the waste, or, for
characteristic wastes, specifically exclude them from classification as
hazardous wastes upon compliance with the contingent regulation. In other
words, contingent management relies on the simultaneous assertion of
jurisdiction over unregulated wastes and disavowal of jurisdiction over
wastes that comply with the contingent requirements. This may have
implications for EPA's legal authority to exempt, contingently, wastes from
regulation under Subtitle C.

92
64 Fed. Reg. 46,476 (1999).
93
This conditional exclusion would be included as part of the listing description contained in
40 C.F.R. § 261.32 (2000).
94
62 Fed. Reg. 6,622 (1997).
95
40 C.F.R. § 266.205 (2000).

Regulation by Bootstrap: Contingent Management of Hazardous Wastes
2.

Establishment of Management Requirements

The key element of a contingent management approach is the
imposition of enforceable regulatory requirements. The contingent
management proposals discussed above generally contain detailed sets of
management requirements that must be satisfied as a condition for exclusion.
In most cases, these management requirements reflect EPA's
determination that certain conditions must be met in order to adequately
protect human health and the environment. What they may not reflect is
specific statutory requirements that Congress has established regarding the
disposal of hazardous waste. In its proposed contingent management
regulation of a chlorinated aliphatic waste, for example, EPA would exempt
the waste from classification as a hazardous waste if it is disposed of in a
landfill meeting Subtitle C or Subtitle D requirements. 6 Although a
hazardous waste that is disposed of in a landfill must satisfy statutory land
disposal restrictions,9 these conditionally exempt wastes, when land
disposed, would not. Perhaps more significantly, EPA, through contingent
management, is permitting disposal of wastes in facilities that do not satisfy
the extensive requirements, including minimum technology, financial
assurance, and corrective action, that the statute imposes on TSDFs under
Subtitle C. 98
Through the slight of hand of contingent management, wastes are
exempt from classification as hazardous; thus, they evade the mandatory
requirements that apply to hazardous waste. 99 EPA may be using contingent
management to establish enforceable requirements that it could not justify
under either Subtitle C or Subtitle D. In short, EPA has attempted to have
two wrongs make a right.
3.

Enforcement of Contingent Management Requirements

To EPA, the perceived advantage of the contingent management
approach is that it allows federal enforcement of waste management
96
64 Fed. Reg. 46,476, 46,508 (1999). Other contingent management proposals may not raise
the same land ban concerns. The HWIR proposal to exempt conditionally certain wastes managed in
landfills applies to wastes that were previously classified as hazardous waste; it is a mechanism for
removing them from their existing hazardous waste status. Supra notes 88-89. It is EPA's apparent
position, explicit only for its proposed generic exemption, that if the materials were previously hazardous
they would still need to meet land disposal restrictions. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 63,403. EPA's contingent
management proposal for cement kiln dust is based on explicit statutory authority that allows the
modification of land disposal restrictions. 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (2000).
97
Supra note 59.
98
Supra notes 60-63.
99
This seems to be the implication of the court's reasoning in Military Toxics Project v. EPA,
146 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir, 1998). See infra notes 109-114.
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requirements without classifying the waste as hazardous. Violation of the
contingent management requirements results in the waste's losing its
conditional exemption and becoming designated as hazardous. At that point,
the violator is subject to civil and criminal liability under § 3008.100
Although members of the regulated community may be happy to have
their wastes excluded from the hazardous classification, they ought to
contain their joy. If violation of a single element of a contingent management
causes a material to be classified as a hazardous waste, the violator would
potentially be liable for penalties, not from a single violation of the
regulation, but for the full range of penalties for improper disposal of
hazardous waste. In other words, contingent management is an all-or-nothing
approach. Violation of any condition of exemption exposes the violator to
the full range of penalties for non-permitted disposal of hazardous waste.
This can be of tremendous significance under EPA's RCRA Penalty
Policy. °1
In apparent recognition of this all-or-nothing enforcement problem,
EPA suggested a clever enforcement distinction in one of its contingent
management proposals. In the 1999 HWIR proposal, EPA proposed a
distinction between "conditions" and "requirements. '0 2 Violation of a
condition, according to EPA, would cause the waste to lose its conditional
exemption and become a hazardous waste subject to full Subtitle C
enforcement. In contrast, violation of a requirement
might result in a penalty
10 3
but not loss of the hazardous waste exclusion.
Requirements would include certain notification and tracking
procedures that EPA claims are imposed under the authority of §§ 3007 and
2002 of RCRA. However, the legality of such requirements is questionable.
Section 3007 gives EPA the authority to compel persons to provide
information relating to hazardous waste. However, while § 3007 applies only
to information about hazardous wastes, EPA is apparently using it to claim
the authority to impose enforceable notice requirements on wastes that are
specifically excluded from classification as hazardous. Further, § 2002
contains general rule-making authority but no specific authority for the
procedures at issue. Thus, this strategy of establishing enforceable notice
100 In its 1999 HWIR proposal, for example, EPA stated that failure to comply with the
conditions for exemption would render the waste subject to regulation under Subtitle C. The waste would
be considered hazardous and subject to all provisions of RCRA Subtitle C. 64 Fed. Reg. at 64,407.
101 See RCRA Civil Penalty Policy, OESWER Directive 9900.1A (1990). Under its RCRA
Penalty Policy, EPA's calculation of penalties includes, among other things, an assessment of the number,
duration and gravity of the violations. See also 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995) (setting forth "Incentives for
Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations").
102 64 Fed. Reg. at 64,406.
103 In this context, EPA defines a requirement as an obligation whose violation would not affect
the exempt status of the HWIR waste, but would be a violation of RCRA. Id.
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requirements on non-hazardous waste is of questionable legality. 4
Even under EPA's rationale, however, the use of requirements, as
opposed to conditions, to minimize the all-or-nothing enforcement
consequences of contingent management would be limited to information
gathering restrictions potentially justified under §§ 3007 or 2002
4.

Regulatory Coherence

One might hope that implementation of a contingent management
approach would reflect a consistent and rational scheme that clarifies the
waste management requirements for the regulated community. While RCRA
regulations are not noted for their clarity of organization or drafting, the
contingent management approach is particularly piecemeal and incoherent.
Many, but not all, of EPA's contingent management requirements are
included as parts of a subsection in Part 261 that governs exclusions from
classification as hazardous waste. Most provisions of this subsection identify
wastes that are unconditionally excluded from classification as hazardous
waste, but EPA is now complicating this subsection with detailed
management requirements for those wastes that it conditionally exempts.
EPA, however, is not consistent even in this approach. The contingent
management requirements that apply to military munitions, for example, are
included as a subpart to 40 C.F.R. Part 266 (1990) that otherwise deals with
requirements for recyclable materials. In contrast, EPA's proposal to institute
contingent management standards for cement kiln dust would establish a new
Part 259 limited solely to cement kiln dust requirements. Further, EPA's
contingent management requirements for chlorinated aliphatics would be
included as part of the listing description. 0 5 EPA has not articulated a
rationale for use of these differing approaches, and it is likely that this
reflects EPA's own uncertainty as to the legal basis for employing contingent
management.
IV. The Legality of Contingent Management
A.

EPA's Legal Rationalefor ContingentManagement
EPA has articulated its legal rationale for the contingent management

104 Enforceable information disclosure requirements also may raise separate issues under the
Paperwork Reduction Act. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1994). This statute, among other things, authorizes
the Office of Management and Budget to approve or disapprove agency proposals for information
collection.
105 See supra notes 92-93.
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approach in a number of recent rule-makings. 0 6 The basic premise of
conditional regulation is that EPA need not list a waste as hazardous, even if
it is inherently toxic, if there is no "need" for regulation. 0 7 Relying on the
statutory language of §§ 1004(5) and 3001 and the listing criteria in 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.11, EPA has concluded that it may determine not to list a waste if
mismanagement is implausible or if the waste is otherwise adequately
regulated.'0 8 This statement itself is an unremarkable restatement of the
statutory and regulatory listing criteria.
The remarkable extension of this rationale is EPA's claim that it may
therefore adopt a set of regulations under RCRA that themselves remove the
risk of plausible mismanagement. It is one thing to say that a waste will not
be listed as a hazardous waste because existing data do not show a threat of
mismanagement or that regulations legally adopted under other regulatory
schemes minimize the threat of mismanagement. It is quite another to claim
legal authority, not otherwise available to regulate a non-hazardous waste, to
create the very conditions that justify a decision not to regulate a waste as
hazardous in the first place. It is even more remarkable to claim authority to
avoid legal requirements, such as "land disposal restrictions," which would
otherwise apply if the waste were classified as hazardous.
Indeed, there is a quality of optical illusion about EPA's approach; it is
both appealing and disturbing. Viewed from one perspective, it is simply an
attempt to define those conditions under which wastes will satisfy the criteria
for classification as a hazardous waste. Viewed from another perspective, it
106 See, e.g., 64 Fed Reg. 63,382 (1999) (proposed Hazardous Waste Identification Rule); 64
Fed. Reg. 46,476 (1999) (proposed conditional listing of certain chlorinated aliphatic wastes); 64 Fed.
Reg. 45,632, 45,641 (1999) (proposed conditional exemption for cement kiln dust, citing rationale in 1997
Military Munitions Rule preamble); 64 Fed. Reg. 10,064 (1999) (advanced notice of proposed rulemaking for storage of mixed low-level radioactive waste); 62 Fed. Reg. 6622 (1997) (Military Munitions
Rule).
107 Although EPA asserts this general rationale in justifying contingent management, there are
other explanations that may apply to specific regulatory decisions. In 1997, for example, EPA
promulgated a conditional exemption for shredded circuit boards generated by the electronics industry. 62
Fed. Reg. 25,998 (1997). This conditional exemption excluded the material from classification as a solid
waste in addition to its exclusion as a hazardous waste. Consequently, EPA justified this exemption by
way of its criteria for granting a variance for classification of a material as a solid waste, rather than
relying on the general hazardous waste rationale. 40 C.F.R. § 261.30-.31 (2000).
In addition to the general rationale, EPA could also make a lesser-included-authority argument. In
other words, EPA's authority to regulate a waste as hazardous includes the authority to establish lesser
regulations. In its 1999 HWIR proposal, EPA proposed the option of excluding otherwise hazardous
wastes from hazardous waste classification if they either 1) contain constituents below exclusion levels or
2) contain constituents below exclusion levels and are managed in appropriate landfills. See supra notes
88-89. Presumably, EPA could claim that if it has the authority either to regulate fully or exclude from
regulation, it must have the authority to take an intermediate step of exclusion with contingent regulation.
However, the decision to classify a material as a hazardous waste is an either-or proposition. Through
contingent management, EPA is claiming authority to impose restrictions that it could not impose if the
waste were either classified as hazardous or excluded from classification.
108 See infra notes 115-139 for an analysis of the legality of this position.
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is EPA's imposition of an entire regulatory program on materials without
either invoking the statutory requirement for classification as a hazardous
waste or complying with mandatory statutory consequences that flow from
that classification.
B.

Evaluation of Contingent Management in Military Toxics Project v.
EPA

EPA has stated that the legality of contingent management was upheld
in Military Toxics Project v. EPA.' 09 In fact, Military Toxics Project failed to
address the significant legal concerns raised by contingent management. The
case involved, among other things, a challenge to EPA's decision to
conditionally exempt certain waste munitions from classification as
hazardous waste. Under the challenged regulation, the wastes would be
exempt if they were managed in compliance with existing Department of
Defense (DOD) and Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements and
the relevant party had met certain EPA established inventory and notice
requirements. Petitioners claimed that the conditional exemption was not
authorized by RCRA and that the conditional regulations were "not as
protective as the Subtitle C regulatory scheme. ' 1' 0
Although the court upheld the concept of conditional exemption, it did
so in a way that avoided the most significant issues. First, the court only
addressed the issue of whether EPA could conditionally exempt a waste
based on compliance with DOD and DOT regulations validly adopted under
other regulatory authority."' The court, in fact, characterized the conditions
directly imposed by EPA as "other criteria not relevant here.""' 2
Second, under the court's approach to evaluating contingent
management, the only relevant issue was whether EPA could exclude
military munitions from classification as a hazardous waste. The court
claimed that the "flaw" in petitioner's argument for the application of
Subtitle C requirements was that those requirements applied only to
hazardous waste. Since the conditional exemption removed the waste from
classification as a hazardous waste, EPA had no obligation to promulgate
109 146 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The EPA contends that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
expressly upheld EPA's authority under RCRA to establish a conditional exemption from Subtitle C
regulation for wastes that would be hazardous, absent the exemption. 64 Fed. Reg. 45,632, 45,641 (1999).
110 146 F.3dat 957.
Ill The court summarized EPA's rationale for contingent management. Because a hazardous
waste is by definition a substance that poses "a substantial threat to human health and the environment
when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed, the EPA concludes
that where a waste might pose a hazard only under limited management scenarios, and other regulatory
programs already address such scenarios, EPA is not required to classify a waste as hazardous waste
subject to regulation under Subtitle C." Id. (emphasis added) (citations and intemal quotations omitted).
112 Id. at 948.
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regulations. According to the court, the petitioner "thus accuses EPA of
failing to fulfill an obligation that simply is not there-assuming, that is, the
to exempt the munitions from
agency has the authority conditionally
113
classification as hazardous waste."
At that point the court simply analyzed EPA's decision to exempt the
waste from classification as hazardous, not EPA's authority or ability to
impose enforceable conditions as a prerequisite to an exemption. Relying on
the statutory language, the court held that EPA could legitimately make a
decision not to regulate a waste under Subtitle C based on its assessment of
whether such regulation was necessary. 14 The court also concluded that it
was not arbitrary and capricious for EPA to conclude that compliance with
the military regulations would adequately protect human health and the
environment.
If contingent management were limited to compliance with regulations
that have been legally adopted under the authority of other statutes, it would
be an interesting but minor aspect of RCRA. However, what EPA is in fact
claiming as contingent management is far broader. EPA, among other things,
is asserting the authority to establish its own enforceable requirements under
Subtitle C of RCRA while avoiding the classification as hazardous waste that
is a prerequisite to regulation under that subtitle. The court in Military Toxics
Project simply did not address the legality of EPA's conditioning the
exclusion on compliance with other regulations and EPA's own
requirements. And it certainly did not address the issue of whether, through
contingent exemptions, EPA can avoid RCRA requirements, such as the land
disposal restrictions, that would otherwise apply to hazardous waste.
C.

Legal Concerns with Contingent Management

EPA's use of contingent management raises several significant legal
issues that have not yet been addressed by the courts.
1.

Contingent Management May Be Based on an Improper
Application of Statutory and Regulatory Hazardous Waste Listing
Criteria

Both EPA's stated rationale and the holding in Military Toxics Project
suggest that contingent management is simply an application of statutory and
113 Id. at957.
114 The court recognized that this case did not involve an application of the listing criteria at
261.11. However, it did say that the rationale of those criteria-and the application of those criteria in
Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1994)-justified a decision based on EPA's
assessment of the need for regulation. 146 F.3d at 958.
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regulatory criteria that establish evidence of "mismanagement" as a
condition for designating a waste as hazardous. Neither the statute nor EPA's
listing criteria, however, directly support EPA's authority to exclude wastes
from classification as hazardous based upon compliance with conditions
created as part of the RCRA process itself.
First, the sections of RCRA on which EPA relies do not support the use
of contingent management. Section 1004(5)(B) defines a "hazardous waste"
as solid waste which may present a substantial present or potential hazard to
human health or the environment "when improperly ... managed."1' 15 EPA
has stated that it "reads this provision to allow it to determine the
circumstances under which a waste may present a hazard and to regulate
only when those conditions occur."' 1 16 EPA also claims to find support in §
3001 based on language that allows EPA to develop criteria for hazardous
wastes which should be subject to Subtitle C. It is, of course, possible to
construe these sections to require EPA to justify classifying a material as a
hazardous waste upon a showing that a significant human health or
environmental risk would arise if the material were mismanaged. Nothing in
the statutory language or legislative history cited by EPA, however, suggests
that EPA can establish regulations outside the requirements of Subtitle C to
prevent those conditions from arising.
Second, EPA has claimed support for its use of contingent management
as an application of the listing criteria that EPA has promulgated at 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.1 1. 17 There are, however, significant problems with reliance on EPA's
listing criteria as a justification for contingent management. EPA has never
claimed that these criteria are an appropriate basis for exempting a
"characteristic" waste from classification as a hazardous waste. It is quite an
extension of EPA's existing regulations to say that EPA can exclude a waste
that exhibits a hazard characteristic because EPA had the discretion not to
list the waste. Thus, to the extent that EPA is employing the contingent
management technique to exempt characteristic wastes it may be improperly
relying on the listing criteria.
Perhaps more significantly, the relevant regulatory listing factors,
115

42 U.S.C. § 6903(5). Unlike EPA's listing criterion discussed below, § 1004(5) does not

refer to plausible mismanagement. It simply requires a showing of harm in the event of mismanagement.
Id.
116 60 Fed. Reg. 57,747, 57,777 (1995). EPA claims this position is supported by the language
of § 1004(5)(A) which, according to EPA and in contrast to § 1004(5)(B), defines certain wastes as
hazardous based on their "inherent" danger without regard to mismanagement. Additionally, EPA claims
that the legislative history supports this position, citing to a House Report which states that "the basic
thrust of this hazardous waste title is to identify what wastes are hazardous in what quantities, qualities
and concentration, and the methods of disposal which may make such wastes hazardous." 60 Fed. Reg. at
57,777 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94 (1976)).

117

See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of these criteria.
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regulations," do not justify the imposition of conditions as a basis for
exclusion. Under 40 C.F.R. § 261.1 1(a)(3), EPA's listing decision is based,
in part, on the "plausible types of improper management to which the waste
could be subjected."' "18 Pursuant to this factor, a decision to list a waste

hinges not only on the inherent toxicity of the waste but also on the
possibility of past or future mismanagement. At a minimum, the existence of
this factor requires EPA to document its evaluation of "plausible
mismanagement," and recent decisions have established a rather stringent
requirement on EPA to document examples of past mismanagement.1 1 9
Indeed, the courts seem to have placed an affirmative burden on EPA to
justify the possibility of mismanagement as a requirement for listing.12
118 40 C.F.R. § 261.1 l(a)(3)(vii) (2000). In the preamble to its 1980 regulations, EPA stated:
It is EPA's conviction that most wastes are hazardous only because they pose a substantial
present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly managed
and thus meet part [B] of the statutory definition of hazardous waste. Nevertheless, EPA
recognizes that there are wastes which are so acutely hazardous that they can be considered
to present a substantial hazard whether improperly managed or not.
45 Fed. Reg. 33,084, 33,106 (1980) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the
plausible mismanagement criterion arises from EPA's "conviction." Certainly, nothing in the statutory
definition directly limits classification of hazardous wastes only to those where EPA shows that there is
the possibility of "plausible" mismanagement. The statute merely identifies hazardous wastes as those that
pose a threat to human health or the environment when mismanaged. No case, however, has addressed
whether the criterion of plausible mismanagement is proper under RCRA.
119 See, e.g., Edison Elec. Instit. v. EPA, 2 F.3d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Dithiocarbamate Task
Force v. EPA, 98 F.3d 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Cf Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 210 F.3d 396 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(holding that EPA may assess distinct solvents rather than combinations in assessing plausible
mismanagement scenarios). In Dithiocarbamate Task Force v. EPA, for example, the D.C. Circuit
invalidated EPA's listing of a number of hazardous wastes in part based on the court's conclusion that
EPA had failed to address the issue of plausible mismanagement. 98 F.3d 1394. If this opinion simply
held that EPA must consider all of the factors enumerated in subsection (a)(3), see supra note 31, it would
be unremarkable. The opinion, however, implies more. First, the court noted that the "improper
management" factor (vii) is not only mentioned in other enumerated factors (namely, (iii) and (ix)), but
also is an "echo" of the statutory definition of hazardous waste. 98 F.3d at 1897-99. Thus, although the
court claimed deference to EPA's weighting of the factors, it seems to elevate the status of possible
mismanagement in the listing decision. Id. The court was certainly explicit that EPA cannot justify a
listing decision based solely on the inherent toxicity of the wastes. Id. at 1399. Further, the court was
particularly willing to reject EPA's asserted claims of plausible mismanagement and seemed to place a
substantial burden of proof on the agency to justify its claims. Id.
120 See, e.g., id. Although not discussed by the court, EPA may have created this situation by a
1990 amendment to the listing criteria. When originally promulgated in 1980, the regulation provided that
a waste could be listed if the waste contained an Appendix VIII constituent unless EPA determined it was
not capable of posing a substantial hazard. See 45 Fed. Reg. 33,121 (1980). In 1990, EPA amended the
regulations to their current form which authorizes listing if the waste contains an Appendix VIII
constituent and EPA affirmatively determines that it poses a hazard. See 55 Fed. Reg. 18,726 (1990). This
change appears to have reversed the presumption of listing. Under the 1980 version any waste which
contained an Appendix VIII constituent could be listed unless EPA determined it was not capable of
posing a threat. 45 Fed. Reg. at 33,121. Under the 1990 amendments, a waste could be listed if it
contained an Appendix VIII constituent and EPA affirmatively determined that it is capable of causing a
threat. See 55 Fed. Reg. at 18,726.
EPA made this change without going through notice and comment procedures based on its claim
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Although case law suggests that EPA not only may, but must, assess the
possible mismanagement of wastes in applying its listing criteria, the existing
cases primarily focus on technical and historical factors relating to the
mismanagement of wastes. Nothing in these cases or the listing criterion
implies that the possibility of "plausible mismanagement" is to be assessed in
light of contingent regulation. 2 '
Another of the enumerated listing factors in subsection (a)(3) is
"[a]ction taken by other governmental agencies or regulatory programs based
on the health or environmental hazard posed by the waste or waste
constituent."'' 22 This factor presumably gives EPA the discretion to consider
the impact of other government regulations on the need to list a waste. 23 In
Natural Resources Defense Counsel v. EPA, 24 the court upheld EPA's
decision not to list used oil based, in part, on the existence of regulations
promulgated by other federal agencies that affected the management of used
oil. 25 This factor focuses on the need to list a waste as hazardous in light of
the existence of programs established under the authority of other regulatory
agencies; this factor certainly does not imply that EPA can use the factor
itself as a basis for authority to contingently regulate a waste.

that it was a "technical correction" that did not affect EPA listing practices. Following legal challenge,
EPA withdrew the amendment but readopted it after notice and comment. See 56 Fed. Reg. 33,238
(1991); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Reilly, 1 F.3d 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1993). EPA continued to claim, however, that
the change did not affect listing practices. Id.
It is somewhat strange for EPA to claim that its original regulation placed the burden on EPA to
affirmatively document plausible mismanagement as a condition for listing. In the preamble to its original
1980 regulations, EPA justified its listing criteria with a reference to a Senate bill that was a predecessor
to RCRA. EPA stated that "[t]he Senate bill, like RCRA's final regulations envisioned a presumption in
favor of listing based on the presence of a toxic constituent in the waste which is rebuttable by a
consideration of other factors." 45 Fed. Reg. at 33,107.
121 Indeed, EPA's separate consideration under § 261.11(a)(3) of other existing regulations
might be taken to imply that the assessment of plausible mismanagement does not include the impact of
regulatory requirements.
122 40C.F.R. § 261.11(a)(3)(x) (1980).
123 It is therefore closely related to EPA's assessment of plausible mismanagement scenarios.
See DithiocarbamateTask Force v. EPA, 98 F.3d 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
124 25 F.3d 1063, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
125 The court also allowed EPA to rely on the fact that some portion of used oil would be
regulated as hazardous waste since it would exhibit the toxicity characteristic. The court declined to
accept what it considered an apparent attack on the adequacy of the toxicity characteristic. Id. at 1068-69.
The court also rejected the argument that EPA could rely on other regulatory programs only if they were
as "comprehensive" as regulation under Subtitle C of RCRA. Id. at 1022. Since, the court reasoned,
almost any other program is less comprehensive than RCRA, acceptance of this argument would mean
that EPA could never rely on other programs in making listing decisions. Id. The majority declined to
consider whether EPA could legitimately assume compliance with those other regulatory requirements
when addressing the listing factors relating to "improper" management. Id. at 1071. The majority
concluded that the issue had not been properly raised at an earlier stage in the proceeding. Id. Judge Wald,
in dissent, thought the issue had been properly raised and found that EPA had not justified its apparent
conclusion that the existing regulatory framework would ensure that improper management would not
occur. Id. at 1078 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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Contingent Management Improperly Relies on Factors that EPA
May Not Consider Under RCRA

Both explicitly and implicitly, the purpose of contingent management is
to exempt certain materials from both the stigma and cost of hazardous waste
regulation. 126 Indeed, those must be the basic objectives of contingent
management. Since classification of a waste as hazardous is a prerequisite to
its use, the only advantages of contingent management are the ability to
avoid the stigma of classification and the cost of applying mandatory
statutory provisions, such as the land ban. There is substantial doubt whether
either stigma or cost can legitimately be considered by EPA as part of a
decision to list a waste as hazardous.
a. Stigma
Concerns with stigma stem from the possibility that recycling or other
proper management practices might actually be discouraged if a waste is
listed as hazardous. Recognizing this possibility, EPA regulations specify,
for example, that recycled hazardous wastes are to be called "recyclable
materials" rather than "recycled hazardous waste.' 27 EPA applies this term
"to avoid conceivable stigmatization."' 128 This regulation, however, applies to
materials that have otherwise been classified as hazardous waste.
EPA's attempt to use stigma as a rationale for not listing a waste as
hazardous has been specifically rejected in court. In Hazardous Waste
Treatment Council v. EPA, 29 the court reviewed a challenge to EPA's
decision not to list used oil as a hazardous waste. EPA justified its decision,
126 EPA does not generally acknowledge reliance on stigma as a basis for the use of contingent
management. Comments from industry do, however, raise this concern. Several comments on EPA's
recent contingent management proposal for cement kiln dust raised concerns with the stigma associated
with hazardous waste classification. See, e.g., 64 Fed. Reg. 45,632, 45,634, 45,641 (1999).
EPA has been somewhat more forthcoming about its reliance on cost as a basis for contingent
management. EPA justified its proposed contingent management regulation of cement kiln dust, in part,
because full Subtitle C regulation would be "prohibitively expensive" and would impose "unnecessary
compliance costs." See 64 Fed Reg. 45,632, 45,641 (1999). In its 1999 proposed contingent management
regulation of a chlorinated aliphatics production waste, EPA apparently used cost as a partial basis to
justify its decision to impose reduced requirements through contingent management, stating, "EPA
believes that an opportunity exists to establish a conditional management listing for these sludges that will
reduce the risks associated with unsafe management practices, while not imposing significant incremental
costs upon generators managing the wastes in a manner that does not pose significant risk." 64 Fed. Reg.
46,476, 46,508 (1999).
127 40C.F.R. §261.6(a)(1)(2000).
128 50 Fed. Reg. 646 (1985). Although EPA regulations provide that the label of "recyclable
materials" is to be used, this is a "custom more honored in the breach than the observance." Id. As
discussed infra, development and consistent use of separate labels for different subclasses of hazardous
waste might actually minimize some concerns relating to stigma.
129 861 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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in part, on the unwanted effects of the stigma of hazardous waste listing. The

D.C. Circuit rejected this rationale and held that EPA could not consider
stigma in making listing decisions. The court noted that RCRA and EPA's
implementing regulations refer only to technical characteristics of hazardous
waste and do not mention stigma. 3 ° The court acknowledged that EPA's
concerns with the effects of listing might be warranted, but stated that

"[n]evertheless, it is the Agency's obligation to comply with the dictates of
Congress, and ours to enforce them."'' The court provided little analysis of
why the statute itself precluded consideration of stigma. Because its decision
relied on the absence of stigma under EPA's listing criteria, the court did not
speak to whether EPA could consider the effects of stigma if its own listing
criteria were modified. In light of Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, and
in the absence of an amendment to its listing criteria, EPA seems to be
precluded from using stigma concerns as a basis for a listing and, therefore,
contingent management decisions132

b.

Cost

Another possible justification for contingent management is to avoid
costs associated with full regulation of a waste as hazardous. Nothing in the
statute or EPA regulations, however, expressly authorizes consideration of
cost factors in making a hazardous waste classification. 3 3 The definition of

130 The court rejected an argument that specific provisions of RCRA addressing the recycling of
used oil allowed EPA to consider the stigmatizing effects of listing. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council,
861 F.2d at 275.
131 ld. at277.
132 EPA has not, however, totally forgone references to stigma in its listing decisions. In a
recent decision not to classify fossil fuel wastes as hazardous, EPA stated:
Normally, concerns about stigma are not a deciding factor in EPA's decisions under RCRA,
given the central concern under the statute for protection of human health and the
environment. However, given our conclusion that the subtitle D approach here should be
fully effective in protecting human health and the environment, and given the large and
salutary role that beneficial reuse plays for this waste, concern over stigma is a factor
supporting our decision today that subtitle C regulation is unwarranted in light of our
decision to pursue a subtitle D approach.
65 Fed. Reg. 32,214, 32,217 (2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261).
133 In its 1994 Hazardous Waste Listing Determination Policy, EPA identified cost as relevant
under the (a)(3) factors only for determining whether a mismanagement scenario is plausible. EPA wrote:
In the absence of other potential cost factors, such as liability, the plausibility that a facility
would choose a waste management scenario increases as the expense of that management
practice decreases. Conversely, it is more implausible to assume that a firm would choose
management activities that impose a higher cost (where cost includes the likelihood of future
potential liabilities). Cost can be a consideration that the Agency uses in choosing which
management scenario to project as a scenario to analyze for determining potential risk of
waste management.
59 Fed. Reg. 66,072, 66,074 (1994). Obviously, this is not a claim that EPA can decline to list a waste
based on the resultant costs.
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"hazardous waste" in § 1004(5) identifies factors relating to the inherent
toxicity of a waste but allows, in its closest approach to cost concerns,
classification of those wastes that pose a "substantial" risk if "improperly"
managed. EPA's regulatory factors in 261.1 1(a)(3) do not expressly allow
cost considerations. Under the logic of Hazardous Waste Treatment Council,
the absence of cost considerations in these factors would preclude their use.
But there may be stronger reasons for concluding that cost is not
appropriately considered as part of a listing decision. The absence of a
specified cost factor (unlike the absence of a stigma factor) reflects the
structure of Subtitle C of RCRA. Hazardous waste classification is a function
of the environmental threat posed by a waste. Considerations of inherent
toxicity, plausible mismanagement, and alternative regulatory controls all
serve to define the basic listing standard of substantial risk to human health
and the environment. EPA is not authorized, explicitly at least, to decline 1to
34
regulate a waste as hazardous because it judges the cost to be too great.
EPA itself has disclaimed the authority to use cost in establishing Subtitle C
regulations.135 To the extent that EPA is using cost considerations as a basis
for imposing reduced requirements through contingent management, it may
again be circumventing otherwise applicable RCRA requirements.
3. Contingent Management Allows
Applicable Statutory Requirements

Avoidance

of

Otherwise

As noted, classification as a hazardous waste results in a number of
management requirements. EPA may have the discretion to waive some in
the context of Subtitle C Minus regulations, but other requirements are
statutory minimums. 36 Although Congress provided an express waiver of
these requirements for certain mining industry wastes that EPA proposes to
regulate through contingent management,1 37 no such statutory waiver applies
to other types of wastes. To the extent that EPA is avoiding application of
these requirements for contingently exempt non-mining wastes, it is avoiding
the specific requirements of the statute.
It seems an extraordinary stretch of EPA's statutory authority to claim
that Congress intended to give EPA, through contingent management, the
discretion to avoid otherwise applicable requirements. This is particularly
134 This is not to say that EPA might not attempt to justify a listing decision on grounds of cost.
EPA justified a decision not to list certain mining wastes as hazardous based in part on its conclusion that
application of Subtitle C requirements was "technically infeasible, or economically impractical." 51 Fed.
Reg. 24,496 (1986). EPA, however, apparently claimed that special provisions applicable to mining
wastes specifically authorized consideration of cost. Id. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921(a), 6981(0(5) (2000).
135 See supra note 64.
136 See supranotes 59-62 and accompanying text.
137 See 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (2000).
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true in light of the history of the mandatory provisions of RCRA. When
initially adopted in 1976, RCRA generally conferred authority upon EPA to
adopt regulations "necessary to protect human health and the
environment.' ' 1 38 In the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA)
of 1984, however, Congress amended RCRA to establish mandatory
minimum requirements and limit EPA's discretion. The mandatory HSWA
provisions were specifically adopted to restrict EPA's discretion in response
to widespread concerns about EPA's implementation of RCRA under the
Reagan administration. 139 This history establishes that EPA has no discretion
to avoid the mandatory requirements under the guise of contingent
management.
4.

Application of Contingent Management is Boundless

The logic behind contingent management makes its application
essentially boundless. To the extent that EPA claims that it can eliminate the
risk of mismanagement through contingent management, application of the
concept is not limited to "not very hazardous" wastes. Indeed, it would
appear any waste could be exempted from regulation as a hazardous waste.
EPA need merely create conditions for exemption that control the risk of
mismanagement, and the need for regulation under Subtitle C is avoided.
RCRA is reduced to a scheme for classification of wastes as hazardous and
an enforceable prohibition against disposal of hazardous waste. All other
management requirements are developed at EPA's discretion through
promulgation of conditions for contingent management.
V.

Contingent Management as an Exercise of Agency Discretion

EPA's adoption of contingent management regulations can be seen as a
straightforward issue of EPA's interpretation of the statutory and regulatory
criteria for classification of hazardous wastes; on its face, EPA is simply
defining the statutory and regulatory predicate of "mismanagement.' 140 Thus
138 See RICHARD C. FORTUNA & DAVID J. LENNETT, HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION: THE
NEW ERA 10 (1987) (stating that prior to the HSWA amendments, RCRA "provid[ed] EPA with wide
latitude in designing the particulars of the regulatory program"); Erik H. Corwin, Note, Congressional
Limits on Agency Discretion: A Case Study of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, 29
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 517, 529 (1992).
139 James J. Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in the 1980's, 3
YALE J. ON REG. 351, 376 (1986). See, e.g., Corwin, supra note 138, at 525.
140 Agencies commonly define terms and, implicitly or explicitly, establish the criteria for
satisfying a definitional term. Furthermore, agency attempts to impose or waive requirements outside the
scope of statutes are hardly unknown. Through the exercise of enforcement discretion, for example, EPA
has attempted to use explicit exercises of enforcement discretion to allow polluters greater time than
authorized by statute to come into compliance. In the 1970's, EPA issued enforcement compliance
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phrased, the issue of the legality of contingent management may hinge on the
extent of judicial deference to EPA's interpretation of RCRA and its
implementing regulations.
This issue leads, as all administrative law roads must, to Chevron USA,
Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 41 the Supreme Court's
contemporary statement of the role of courts in review of agency
interpretation. Under the familiar Chevron two step analysis, courts are
instructed to defer to an agency interpretation unless, first, Congress has
directly spoken to the precise issue, or second, the Agency's construction42
does not fall within some reasonable range of interpretations of the statute.
A concept of judicial deference to agency action is not new. 143 What Chevron
added was a distinct rationale for such deference. In addition to the more
traditional recognition of agency expertise and competence, the Chevron
court added the remarkable premise that statutory ambiguities imply a
delegation of authority to the more politically accountable executive
44
agencies, rather than the courts, to resolve such ambiguity.1
schedule letters, stating that it would not bring enforcement actions for failure to achieve compliance by
the statutory deadline if the discharger made good faith efforts to comply. See Norton J. Tennile, Jr.,
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Enforcement From the Discharger's Perspective: The Uses and
Abuses of Discretion, 7 ENV'T. L.REP. 50,091 (1977). Through negotiated consent decrees, EPA has
privately negotiated regulatory requirements in the context of resolution of litigation. See Jeffrey M.
Gaba, Informal Rule-making by Settlement Agreement, 73 GEO. L.J. 1241 (1985). This process has also
been discussed with respect to procedures at other agencies. See Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins,
Averting Government by Consent Decree: ConstitutionalLimits on the Enforcement of Settlements with
the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REV. 203 (1987); Peter M. Shane, Federal Policy Making by
Consent Decree: An Analysis of Agency and Judicial Discretion, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241. Through
licensing decisions, some agencies have attempted to "jawbone" industry into accepting obligations that
the agencies might not have had the legal or political power to impose through rule-making. See, e.g.,
Writers Guild of Am. v. Am. Broad. Co., 609 F.2d 355, 359-66 (9th Cir. 1979) (describing "jawboning"
by FCC to attempt to force broadcasters to "voluntarily" limit depictions of sex and violence).
Commentators have identified concerns with agency imposition of conditions in this manner. See,
e.g., Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of CongressionalDelegations of Authority,
1997 Wis. L. REV. 873. Thus improper exercises of agency authority through jawboning hardly justify the
improper exercise of authority through contingent management. The use of contingent management as a
comprehensive regulatory technique raises questions beyond those raised by case-by-case "jawboning" or
exercises of enforcement discretion. Contingent management uses the rule-making process formally to
bind the agency to positions on the application of a statute, and EPA asserts a specific statutory basis for
its position. This is not a case of interstitial manipulation of a statute by an agency. Under the rationale
advanced by EPA, contingent management is a comprehensive basis for regulation.
141 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Administrative law scholars contend that Chevron may qualify as the
most influential case in American public law, measured in sheer number of citations. See, e.g., STEVEN G.
BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 256 (4th ed. 1999).
142 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath:
JudicialReview ofAgency InterpretationsofStatutory Provisions,41 VAND. L. REv. 301 (1988).
143 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (regarding deference in the context
of agency rule-making); NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (regarding deference in the context of
agency adjudication).
144 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. The Supreme Court, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S.
120, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 1314 (2000), stated, "deference under Chevron to an agency's construction of a
statute that it administers is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit
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Whatever one can say about the conceptual basis of Chevron-and
almost everyone has said something-the two step approach is clearer in
statement than in application. Although a strict application of Chevron might
suggest that an agency interpretation should win if at all plausible, that has
not been the experience in applying Chevron. 45 Whether under the guise of a
Step One or Step Two analysis, courts have been remarkably willing to
engage in rather traditional forms of statutory
interpretation to evaluate the
46
interpretation.
agency's
an
of
legitimacy
Both opponents and supporters of contingent management can fashion
plausible arguments that Chevron supports their position. On the one hand,
opponents can argue that, viewing the provisions of RCRA as a whole,
Congress did not intend to authorize a mechanism that, first, circumvents
statutorily prescribed consequences of hazardous waste classifications,
second, has the potential to displace the entire regulatory scheme created by
Congress in Subtitle C, and, third, authorizes the imposition of conditions on
a class of non-hazardous solid waste not otherwise authorized by the statute.
This is plausible as a Step One argument that Congress clearly did not intend
such an interpretation or as a Step Two argument that EPA's interpretation is
not within some range of plausible constructions of the statute. On the other
hand, supporters can claim that it is reasonable to conclude that by a
statutory emphasis on mismanagement, Congress authorized EPA to limit the
requirements under Subtitle C to those materials that, in the absence of direct
delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps."
In Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680 (1991), the Court noted:
Judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous provisions of the statutes it is
authorized to implement reflects a sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and judicial
branches. As Chevron itself illustrates, the resolution of ambiguity in a statutory text is often
more a question of policy than of law. When Congress, through express delegation or the
introduction of an interpretive gap in the statutory structure, has delegated policy-making
authority to an administrative agency, the extent of judicial review of the agency's policy
determinations is limited.
Id. at 696-97 (citations omitted). See generally David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of Judicial
Deference to Administrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327 (2000); Pierce, supra note 142; Antonin
Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511.
145 The Supreme Court itself has honored Chevron as much in the breach as in the observance
and has been far from consistent in its views on deference to agency interpretations. See, e.g., Thomas W.
Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994). As noted by
Gellhom and Verkuil, "the United States Supreme Court cases have limited he application of Chevron
more often than they have applied it and the cases often are difficult to reconcile." Ernest Gellhom and
Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-BasedDelegations,20 CARDOZO L. REv. 989, 993 (1999).
146 FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120 (2000), is a recent example of the ambiguity of
finding ambiguity. The Court, in a 5 to 4 vote, held that Congress had unambiguously spoken to the
question of whether FDA could assert jurisdiction over tobacco products. The majority's conclusion that
Congress unambiguously intended to preclude such jurisdiction involved a wide-ranging review of the
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act and other actions by Congress over 35 years. It is hard to know what to
make of the strength of Chevron deference when Congress can be found to have "clearly spoken" to an
issue despite the fact that four of nine members of the Court found the issue ambiguous.
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Subtitle C control, pose risks to human health and the environment.
Contingent management, according to EPA, would satisfy this congressional
objective.
Thus, the legality of EPA's position on contingent management cannot
be resolved by a pro forma claim of deference under Chevron. 47 Perhaps the
better question is whether the underlying logic of Chevron warrants
deference to EPA's position. In other words, is there something inherent in
the concept of contingent management that can inform the issue of proper
judicial role in reviewing EPA's interpretation?
Commentators have noted a number of distinctive factors that may
affect the propriety of deference under Chevron. 4 8 One particular concern is
the extent to which Chevron deference applies to an agency's interpretation
of its own jurisdictional scope. 14 9 This has been articulated in a variety of
ways, ranging from concerns about agency aggrandizement and self-interest,
to traditional common law restraints on an entity's judging the scope of its
own jurisdiction, to problems arising when agencies enter areas beyond the
scope of their expertise. 5 ° Whatever the rationale, courts have evidenced
some concern with agencies' assertions of jurisdiction through expansive
statutory interpretations,' 5 ' and, although unresolved by the case law,
Chevron deference remains somewhat problematic in the context of the
interpretation of agency jurisdiction.' 52
147 The court in Military Toxics Project expressly relied on Chevron as a basis for upholding
EPA's interpretation of contingent management. 146 F.3d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The court, however,
rather glibly dismissed a Step One analysis under Chevron stating that "Congress has not spoken to the
issue of conditional exemptions .
I.."
Id. at 958. Under its Step Two analysis, the court found that EPA's
reading was "a permissible construction of the statute," but the court did so without confronting the more
significant concerns with contingent management discussed above. Id.
148 E.g., Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1990); Steven Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADMIN. L.REv. 363 (1986).
149 E.g., Gellhom and Verkuil, supra note 145; Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts:
Misplaced Metaphors in Administrative Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1463 (1999); Bernard Schwartz,
A Decade ofAdministrative Law: 1987-1996, 32 TULSA L.J. 493, 574 (1997).
150 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071 (1990); Quincy M. Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations that Delimit
the Scope ofthe Agency's Jurisdiction, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 957 (1994).
151 The Fourth Circuit, in Brown & Williamson v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 162 (4th Cir. 1998),
stated, in the context of a discussion of Chevron, that "ascertaining congressional intent is of particular
importance where, as here, an agency is attempting to expand the scope of its jurisdiction." See also
Gellhom and Verkuil, supra 145; see, e.g., Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990) (quoting
Fed. Maritime Commn v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973), that federal agencies "may not
bootstrap [themselves] into an area in which [they] have no jurisdiction"); FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
152 Bernard Schwartz has noted that "the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the
relationship between Chevron and jurisdiction...." Schwartz, supra note 149, at 574, but he has also noted
that several Justices have indicated that Chevron deference applies to interpretations of agency
jurisdiction. Id. Justices Scalia and Brennan expressed differing views of the propriety of Chevron
deference on jurisdictional issues. Compare Miss. Power and Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 377
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One of the criticisms of a special rule for jurisdictional interpretations is
the difficulty of distinguishing jurisdictional from non-jurisdictional
issues."' That difficulty is reflected in the issue of contingent management.
Contingent management can be seen as an interpretation of existing listing
criteria or as a more significant issue involving the scope of EPA's
jurisdiction under Subtitle C and Subtitle D.
Additionally, concerns about jurisdictional deference typically arise in
the context of agency attempts to expand the area of its traditional authority.
In one sense, contingent management reflects an expansion of EPA authority
by imposing contingent restrictions on non-hazardous wastes not otherwise
subject to federal regulation under RCRA. More properly, however,
contingent management can be seen as an attempt by EPA to restrict the
jurisdictional reach of Subtitle C of RCRA. Even in areas where an agency is
restricting its authority, caution in deference may be warranted. 154 In either
view, EPA is defining the boundaries of jurisdiction under RCRA, and
contingent management can be seen as an agency attempt to frustrate a
congressionally crafted distinction between regulation of non-hazardous and
hazardous wastes. EPA is using contingent management to avoid the
consequences of these distinctions."'5
Although the applicability of Chevron may be ambiguous, one thing is
clear. The significance of contingent management warrants a searching and
independent assessment by the courts. Whether in the guise of a Step One or
(1988) (Scalia concurring), with Miss. Power and Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 383 (1988)
(Brennan dissenting).
153 See, e.g., Miss. Power and Light Co. 487 U.S. at 354 (Scalia, J., concurring).
154 Professor Sunstein, in an early article on this issue, suggested some limited situations in
which deference to agency interpretations of expansive jurisdiction would not be appropriate. He then
noted:
It should also follow that agencies will not receive deference when they are denying their
authority to deal with a large category of cases. Here too the agency determination is
jurisdictional. Here too there is risk of bias, in the form not of self-dealing, but instead of an
abdication of enforcement power. Because abdication has been a major legislative fear, and
because deference should not contain an antiregulatory bias, Chevron should be inapplicable
here as well.
Sunstein, supra note 150, at 2100 (citations omitted).
155 There are other reasons to question the scope of Chevron deference in the context of
contingent management. At least one commentator has raised concerns about the effect of Chevron
deference on the power of special interests to influence administrative action. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Deregulation and the Courts, 5 J. POL'Y & MGMT. 517 (1986). EPA's attempts to develop alternative
regulatory mechanisms, reflected in development of contingent management, can be seen as a response to
pressure applied by particular industries attempting to avoid the costs and stigmas of hazardous waste
regulation. Agencies must, of course, be responsive to issues relevant to particular segments of the
regulated community. But the risk of improper political manipulation of agency decisions seems
particularly high given a mechanism, such as contingent management, that allows the agency to avoid
otherwise applicable statutory requirements through an open-ended claim of authority. This risk is also of
particular relevance in light of the history of congressional concerns with the exercise of discretion by
EPA under RCRA. See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text.
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Step Two Chevron analysis or through a conclusion that Chevron deference
is unwarranted, reviewing courts should engage in a full inquiry into the
legitimacy of contingent management under RCRA. In the absence of the
crutch of Chevron deference, EPA's position on the legality of contingent
management is weak.
Nonetheless, as evidenced by the court's approach in Military Toxics
Project v. EPA, it is possible that courts will view contingent management as
a simple application of EPA's discretion to regulate hazardous wastes. Thus,
if there is an arguable (if not compelling) case for contingent management
authority, Chevron deference may lead courts to uphold the contingent
management approach.
VI. Rationalizing the Problem of "Not Very Hazardous" Waste
EPA's use of contingent management is of doubtful legality, but even if
ultimately upheld by courts, it creates problems of enforcement and, frankly,
of public perception. It is a bootstrap attempt to avoid using the regulatory
mechanisms under Subtitle C that Congress has developed. Ultimately,
EPA's use of contingent management is tricky, possibly unlawful, and
certainly unnecessary. EPA can accomplish its legitimate objectives of
tailored regulation and minimized stigma through a more rational application
of a Subtitle C Minus approach. Alternatively, a statutory change to
authorize federal enforcement under Subtitle D would ameliorate virtually all
of the concerns of EPA and the regulated community without resorting to
contingent management.
A.

Regulation under Subtitle C: Doing Better than C Minus

Until Congress amends RCRA, Subtitle C is the best statutory vehicle to
develop a rational system of tailored management standards that addresses
the problems of classification and stigma.
A rational approach would have a series of elements. First, EPA should
formally adopt distinct classes of hazardous waste. In addition to the current,
if unused, distinction between hazardous waste and recyclable materials,
EPA should formally designate a class of special wastes that would be
subject to reduced regulatory requirements. Second, EPA should promulgate
specific regulatory criteria to be used in determining which hazardous wastes
should be classified as special wastes. Third, EPA should clearly establish
separate regulatory programs for these classes of wastes. The class of wastes
labeled "hazardous wastes" should be subject to Full Subtitle C regulation, as
it is now. The class labeled "recyclable materials" should be regulated under
the special management standards contained in 40 C.F.R. Part 266, as is
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largely the case now. The newly designated class of "special wastes" should
be subject to tailored regulatory requirements generally contained in a new
40 C.F.R. Part 267. Finally, EPA should consistently use the waste
classification nomenclature.
1.

Distinct Waste Classifications

Regulatory jurisdiction, for purposes of Subtitle C, is all-or-nothing.
Only materials that are classified as hazardous waste are subject to Subtitle C
regulation and enforcement.' 5 6 Thus, any material that is to be subject to
regulation must meet the statutory and regulatory definition of hazardous
waste.
Nothing, however, prevents EPA from formally establishing distinct
subclasses of materials that otherwise meet the general definition of
hazardous waste. EPA does that now. For example, management standards
applicable to small quantity generators vary depending on whether the waste
is classified as an "acute hazardous waste" or a "hazardous waste." EPA
regulations distinguish, by name and by regulatory standards, the class of
hazardous waste that its regulations label "recyclable materials." EPA also
previously proposed a class of what it called special wastes that consisted of
certain "low toxicity/high volume" wastes. 157
It would be no remarkable stretch of EPA's authority to formally
establish three distinct subclasses of materials within the overall class of
hazardous waste. EPA already purports to define "hazardous waste" and
"recyclable materials." It would need only to define a new class of "special
wastes" for which a set of tailored regulations is appropriate. Separate
designation, and consistent use, of these labels would provide greater clarity
regarding the regulatory requirements applicable to the materials, and, as
discussed below, might minimize some of the concerns with stigma.
2.

Promulgation of Criteria for Classification as Special Wastes

Perhaps the greatest concern with development of reduced hazardous
156 This is not quite accurate. Congress has given EPA regulatory and enforcement authority
over non-hazardous recycled used oil. 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (2000). Congress has also given EPA specific
regulatory and enforcement authority over "hazardous household waste" and hazardous waste from
conditionally exempt small quantity generators that are not otherwise subject to Subtitle C requirements.
42 U.S.C. § 6945(c)(2) (2000).
157 See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. In essence, this article puts forward a
recommendation that EPA resurrect the concept of special wastes that generated such "widespread and
divergent protest from both the regulated community and the public." 45 Fed. Reg. 33,174 (1980).
Twenty years have now passed, and it may be time for the establishment, under suitable constraints, of a
category of special wastes that are to be subject to tailored regulations.
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waste requirements arises from the uncertain scope of EPA's discretion to
apply such standards. In the context of contingent management, EPA
apparently refers to its largely unfettered discretion to "balance" listing
criteria in determining whether to regulate a material as a hazardous waste.
EPA has not, however, provided a consistent statement of the factors it will
use to determine when to adopt reduced regulatory requirements. For
purposes of public policy, judicial review, and potentially, constitutional
authority, EPA should not rely, however, on a case-by-case approach to
developing tailored regulations, but should promulgate the criteria it will use
to make these determinations. Given EPA's general authority to adopt
Subtitle C requirements "as necessary to protect human health and the
environment,"' 5 8 and given a requirement that special wastes satisfy
mandatory statutory requirements, EPA should be able to develop a set of
criteria for identifying wastes that do not need full Subtitle C treatment. Such
criteria might include factors relating to toxicity, stigma, and possibly cost, at
least as reflected in an assessment of whether more costly regulation is
needed to protect public health and the environment.
3.

Separate Management Standards in Separate Parts of the Code of
Federal Regulations

EPA should clearly establish separate regulatory programs for these
classes of wastes. EPA has already essentially established a distinct set of
full Subtitle C requirements applicable to most hazardous wastes. It has also
developed a reduced set of requirements applicable to recyclable materials
largely codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 266. The newly designated class of special
wastes should be subject to tailored regulatory requirements generally
contained in a new 40 C.F.R. Part 267. As a critical element of any tailored
special waste requirements, EPA would be limited to the adoption of
standards that meet the minimum requirements of RCRA, including land
disposal requirements. This will also limit EPA's authority to authorize land
disposal of such special wastes in facilities that do not meet minimum
Subtitle C requirements.15 9
The significance of the placement of these standards in a new Part 267
should not be minimized. RCRA requirements are inherently complex. But
few things are more frustrating than finding that this inherent complexity has
been increased by the irrational structure of EPA's regulations. Who would
guess that EPA's exclusion from regulation of products produced from
158 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
159 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of minimum Subtitle C
requirements.
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recycled hazardous waste would be located as a parenthetical phrase in a
provision defining hazardous waste?160 Why would EPA place its exclusion
of facilities that recycle waste without storage as a subsection in Part 261?
Understanding RCRA would be sufficiently trying even without its
confusing structure and drafting.
It would be more rational, and certainly more helpful to persons trying
to understand and use the regulations, to establish distinct sections
identifying the requirements for hazardous wastes, recyclable materials and
special wastes. Thus, Parts 264 and 265 would identify management
requirements for hazardous wastes. EPA could restrict Part 266 to the
separate sets of management standards applicable to different types of
recyclable materials. EPA could create a comparable new Part 267 that
would contain, as subparts, the sets of management standards applicable to
special wastes. This would
avoid the haphazard and confusing structure that
161
is currently evolving.
4.

Consistent Use of the Waste Classification Nomenclature

The concern with stigma apparently drives much of EPA's use of
contingent management. The "simple" act of deeming a material to be
hazardous is thought to produce regulatory disincentives to proper
management. EPA, in recognition of this possible stigmatizing effect of
labeling, established the label "recyclable materials." However, EPA simply
has not used the label. Recyclable materials, for almost all purposes, are
called hazardous wastes. If EPA's original intention to develop a less
stigmatizing label were applied to special wastes as well as recyclable
materials, and, more to the point, if EPA followed through with consistent
use of these labels, some of the stigma associated with regulation under
Subtitle C might be lessened. For example, a special waste manifest for
cement kiln dust might be less alarming than a hazardous waste manifest,
even if the level of regulatory control were the same.
5.

Enforce Separate Special Waste Requirements Under Subtitle C

If EPA regulated special wastes through separate management standards
160 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(c)(2)(i) (stating in a final parenthetical: "However, materials that are
reclaimed from solid wastes and that are used beneficially are not solid wastes and hence are not
hazardous wastes under this provision unless the reclaimed material is burned for energy recovery or used
in a manner constituting disposal.").
161 Evolution, it should be noted, does not always produce the most effective and efficient
structure. It makes do with alteration of pre-existing structures; it relies on chance and operates from no
pre-established plan. See STEVEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB 76-84 (1992). EPA can, however,

play God and try to use a little more foresight and design skill.
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in a new Part 267, federal enforcement would be the same as that available
for any other violation of Subtitle C requirements. Classification of
violations under the penalty policy would take into account the gravity and
economic benefit of the particular violation. It would not be governed by the
potential all-or-nothing approach to violations that may be a consequence of
contingent management. This factor alone should give the regulated
community incentive to accept a Subtitle C approach to regulation of special
wastes.
B.

Amending the Statute

No single change to RCRA would open more doors to regulatory
alternatives
than amending § 3008(a) by changing the word "subchapter" to
"chapter.' ' 62 This would allow EPA to enforce the requirements of Subtitle
D, including the open dumping prohibition under § 4005(a). EPA could then,
through its authority in §§ 1008(a)(3) and 4004(a), establish tailored sanitary
landfill requirements for non-hazardous waste and prohibit the open dumping
of these wastes in facilities other than those that meet the sanitary landfill
criteria. The specific requirements applicable to hazardous wastes would not
apply to those wastes managed under Subtitle D.
In addition to a change in the enforcement section, Congress should
control the process by establishing the criteria that EPA may use in
determining whether to regulate a waste under Subtitle C or D. Thus,
Congress could, for example, amend 3001(a) to allow EPA to develop
criteria for determining whether a waste should be classified as hazardous for
purposes of Subtitle C. In addition to factors relating to inherent toxicity,
these might include explicit statutory authority to consider the cost of
regulation under Subtitle C, the potential stigmatization effects of regulation
under Subtitle C and the effectiveness of regulation under Subtitle D.
Such changes might be agreeable to EPA, the regulated community and
environmentalists. EPA would obtain clear authority to adopt enforceable
regulations under Subtitle D. This would expand its options when dealing
with wastes.1 63 The regulated community would gain a regulatory program
but lose the stigma. The environmentalists, already faced with EPA claims of
authority to exclude wastes through contingent management, would gain
162 This would presumably allow EPA to enforce violation of the federal open-dumping
prohibition through issuance of compliance orders under § 3008. The same result might be obtained more
explicitly by inserting "or violation of section 4005(a)" in 3008(a). Neither of these changes would make
a violation of Subtitle D criminally enforceable; that would require amendment of §§ 3008(d) and (e).
163 To the extent that this change would also open the door to federal regulation of solid wastes
that are not otherwise hazardous, it would constitute a substantial expansion of EPA jurisdiction, and, of
course, lessen the possibility of consensus.
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clearer authority for federal enforcement and, if criteria were adopted to
distinguish Subtitle C and Subtitle D regulation, some judicial control over
EPA's choice of regulatory strategy.
Conclusion
EPA appears hell-bent on imposing tailored regulation on classes of
wastes that it determines do not warrant full regulation under Subtitle C. The
issues that must be faced include the legal authority for such regulations and,
perhaps more importantly, public accountability and control over the choices
that EPA makes. The ideal solution is for Congress to address the issue by
providing EPA clearer authority and statutory standards for determining
tailored regulations. Under RCRA as it currently exists, a Subtitle C Minus
approach, coupled with criteria for determining when reduced regulation is
warranted, seems to be consistent with the structure of RCRA and more
suitable for enforcement. A contingent management approach is bedeviled
by legal uncertainty and the smell of expediency. Nonetheless, steps could be
taken, through the adoption of specific criteria and a more rational structure
to the regulations, to improve this approach under RCRA. A new Congress
and a new administration will be faced with interesting choices in
rationalizing regulation of "not very hazardous" waste under RCRA.

